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Reciprocal Concealed Carry:
The Constitutional Issues
by WILLIAM D. ARAIZA*

Introduction
With the Supreme Court’s continued unwillingness to decide Second
Amendment cases after its foundational decisions finding an individual gun
possession right1 and applying that right to the states,2 Congress has become
the focal point for national gun rights.3 One particularly noteworthy federal
legislative initiative would require states that allow any form of concealed
weapons carry to honor the concealed carry permits of any other state. In
December, 2017, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 38, The
Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017.4 That bill would amend the

02/26/2019 14:13:21

[571]

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 39 Side A

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to the Center on Gun Violence and
Hastings Law School for hosting the conference for which this Article was prepared, and to
participants at that conference, in particular Joseph Blocher, Darrell A.H. Miller, and Eric Ruben.
Thanks also to Bianca D’Agostaro, Marco Donatelli, Aubria Ralph, and Andrey Udalov for fine
research assistance.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (finding that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to possess guns).
2. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 541 U.S. 742 (2010) (applying the Second Amendment
right to the states, with four justices basing that application on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause and one basing it on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause).
As this Article goes to press, the Court has granted cert. on a Second Amendment case involving a
New York City ordinance that limits the circumstances under which a gun owner may transport her
gun. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of N.Y.,
No. 18-280, (Jan. 22, 2019).
3. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Samuel Alito: Populist, 103 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 101
(2017), for a discussion on the Court’s failure to grant review in significant Second Amendment
cases after McDonald.
4. Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017, H.R. 38, 115th Cong. (2017). This article will
focus on the provisions of this bill. However, one can expect other versions of the bill to be
introduced as legislators continue to work for enactment of concealed carry reciprocity. For
example, the concept of concealed carry reciprocity was explicitly endorsed in the 2016 Republican
Party Platform. See https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]ben_146 8872234.pdf, at 12. For convenience’s sake, this Article uses H.R. 38 as the subject of its
analysis, even though future legislation may differ from that bill.
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5. For a brief description of H.R. 38, see infra Part I. For a more complete description, see
Hannah Shearer, Jeopardizing ‘Their Communities, Their Safety, and Their Lives’: Forced
Concealed Carry Reciprocity’s Threat to Federalism, 45 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 429, 439 (2018).
6. See H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101 (a) (2017).
7. See id. § 101 (c)(1).
8. Id. For a more detailed explanation of H.R. 38, see infra. Part I.
9. See, e.g., DA Vance On Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act, CBSLOCAL.COM (Dec. 9,
2017) https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2017/12/09/da-vance-on-concealed-carry-reciprocity-act-itsridiculous/ (quoting the Manhattan District Attorney to that effect).
10. See infra note 66 (citing case suggesting that the Second Amendment requires some legal
method of public carry).
11. See, e.g., Heather Digby Parton, ‘Look at my gun!’ Why NRA’s scary ‘open carry’ craze
is not about freedom, SALON (May 7, 2014), https://www.salon.com/2014/05/07/look_at_my_ gun
_why_nras_scary_open_carry_craze_is_not_about_freedom/ (recounting stories of citizen fright
when confronted with a person openly displaying a weapon).
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federal criminal code to allow individuals to carry a concealed handgun into
or possess a concealed handgun in another state that allows individuals to
carry concealed firearms.5 Thus, a state could still prohibit any person (a
citizen of that state or a visitor from another) from carrying a concealed
weapon; in such a case the bill would have no effect. However, if a state had
any provision at all for concealed carry, the bill would require it to honor a
concealed carry permit issued by any state, even if the issuing state had more
relaxed requirements for holding such a permit.6 The bill also prohibits any
person thus possessing a concealed weapon from being “arrested or
otherwise detained” without “probable cause” to believe he is not complying
with the bill’s provisions.7 It also provides that “[p]resentation of facially
valid documents as specified in subsection (a) [of the bill] is prima facie
evidence that the individual has [the requisite state-issued] license or
permit.”8
The push for reciprocal concealed carry has generated a great deal of
publicity, much of it negative. Opponents have portrayed it as allowing the
carrying of concealed weapons in Times Square on New Year’s Eve.9 While
such criticism is inaccurate to the extent New York prohibits concealed carry
of any sort, opponents have a point to the extent a state prefers to allow
concealed carry but only under very limited circumstances. Moreover, when
thinking about the extent to which a state might be willing to allow even
limited concealed carry, it bears remembering that it’s at least plausible—
and quite possibly the better reading of current law—that a state must allow
either concealed or open carry in some or most public spaces.10 Thus, a state
that might (understandably) wish to prohibit open carry11 could find itself
constitutionally obligated to allow some degree of concealed carry—which
in turn would trigger the obligations of the reciprocal concealed carry bill,
should it become law. As noted above, that bill would mandate that state to
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12. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
14. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 541 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporating the Second
Amendment, with a four-justice plurality basing that decision on the Due Process Clause and
Justice Thomas reaching the same result based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1.
16. See infra. Part II (A) (considering the Commerce Clause basis for CCR legislation); infra.
Part II (B) (considering the Enforcement Clause basis); infra. Part II (C) (considering the full faith
and credit basis).
17. As discussed throughout this Article, it is unclear whether the anti-commandeering
prohibition applies to all of these sources of federal power. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (considering that prohibition’s applicability to the enforcement power);
see text accompanying infra note 152 (considering its applicability to Congress’s power under
Article IV’s full faith and credit guarantee).
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honor all other states’ concealed carry permits, regardless of whether those
issuing states imposed more lax requirements for obtaining them.
Clearly, then, federal concealed carry reciprocity (“CCR”) legislation
has important implications for gun rights, gun control, and the balance
between state and federal authority to regulate gun possession. Going
beyond such policy practicalities, CCR legislation also implicates a complex
web of constitutional law doctrine spanning not just the scope of the Second
Amendment right but also federalism and the separation of powers.
This Article focuses on both the sources of congressional authority to
enact CCR legislation and what it calls the “constitutional defenses” to CCR
legislation. Such legislation would have to be grounded either in Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce,12 its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment,13 which has been held to incorporate the Second Amendment’s
individual right to possess a weapon,14 or its power granted by Article IV’s
full faith and credit provision.15 Each of these three sources of congressional
power provides at least an argument in favor of Congress’s power to enact
CCR legislation; however, each of them raises serious constitutional
questions. After Part I of this Article introduces the version of CCR
legislation it will analyze, Part II considers whether one or more of these
sources of congressional power authorizes enactment of CCR legislation;16
however, with the exception of its discussion of the enforcement power, it
does not purport to reach a conclusive answer to the congressional power
question.
Instead, this Article assumes that at least one of these sources authorizes
enactment of CCR legislation. It then focuses on whether such a law would
nevertheless violate one of two affirmative limits on congressional
legislation: first, the requirement that federal legislation not “commandeer”
state governments, and second, the requirement that Congress not delegate
away its legislative power.17 Part III concludes that there are plausible
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arguments that CCR legislation, or parts of it, would violate one or both of
these affirmative limitations on congressional power.

I. H.R. 38
Title I of H.R. 38—the Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 201718—
generally requires any state that allows the concealed carriage of a weapon
to honor a concealed carry permit issued by any other state.19 H.R. 38
contains no requirement that an issuing state’s license, in order to be valid in
a host state, be granted only on the satisfaction of certain criteria, except that
the holder of such a license not be prohibited by federal law from carrying a
concealed weapon.20 Thus, for example, under H.R. 38 a person may obtain
a concealed carry license from a state that does not impose any requirements
for obtaining such a license, and insist on the validity of that license in a state
that imposes stringent criteria for obtaining such a license. Indeed, if the
issuing state issues permits to non-residents, a citizen of the host state may
travel to the issuing state, obtain a license, and travel back to her home state
and insist on the license’s validity, even if that home state would have denied
her a license under its own criteria. Perhaps importantly, however, any
holder of an out-of-state-issued concealed carry permit may use that permit
to carry only a gun “that has been shipped or transported in interstate
commerce.”21 As noted below,22 H.R. 38’s drafters may have inserted this
limitation to bring it within the federal power to regulate interstate
commerce.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

See supra, text accompanying note 4.
Notwithstanding any provision of the law of any State or political subdivision
thereof (except as provided in subsection (b)) and subject only to the
requirements of this section, a person who is not prohibited by Federal law from
possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm, who is carrying a valid
identification document containing a photograph of the person, and who is
carrying a valid license or permit which is issued pursuant to the law of a State
and which permits the person to carry a concealed firearm or is entitled to carry
a concealed firearm in the State in which the person resides, may possess or
carry a concealed handgun (other than a machinegun or destructive device) that
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
H.R. 38, § 101 (a) (a).
Subsection (b), referred to above, allows states to authorize a private person to “prohibit guns on
that person’s property, and also allows states to prohibit or restrict the possession of firearms on
any State or local government property, installation, building, base, or park.” Id. § 101 (a) (b).
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See infra Part II (A).
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19.
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The bill also regulates how local law enforcement may respond to a
person who produces an out-of-state-issued concealed carry permit. Section
101(a) states:
(c) (1) A person who carries or possesses a concealed handgun
in accordance with subsections (a) and (b) may not be arrested or
otherwise detained for violation of any law or any rule or regulation
of a State or any political subdivision thereof related to the
possession, transportation, or carrying of firearms unless there is
probable cause to believe that the person is doing so in a manner not
provided for by this section. Presentation of facially valid
documents as specified in subsection (a) is prima facie evidence that
the individual has a license or permit as required by this section.z23
As this Article will explain,24 subsection (c), while perhaps intended to
allow holders of out-of-state-issued concealed carry permits to fully enjoy
the right the bill seeks to provide, raises difficult constitutional questions
about federal power to prescribe how local law enforcement goes about its
work enforcing concealed carry permit requirements.

II. The Power Issues, Briefly Considered

A. The Commerce Power
At first blush, the commerce power presents a highly plausible
constitutional foundation for a CCR law. Even after the last quarter-century
H.R. 38, § 101(a)(c).
See infra. Part III (A).
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; McDonald, 541 U.S. 742.
U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 41 Side A

As noted in the Introduction, three sources of congressional power to
enact H.R. 38, and CCR more generally, immediately present themselves:
the Article I power to regulate interstate commerce,25 the power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 of which has been understood to
incorporate the Second Amendment,26 and the Article IV power to “prescribe
the Manner” in which “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings” to
which full faith and credit must be given “shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.”27 Each of these powers presents a facially plausible foundation for
CCR. But, as this Part preliminarily sketches out, each presents its own
complications and ambiguities.
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of minor cutbacks,28 the commerce power remains broad, and quite capable
of justifying federal regulation of completely intrastate conduct as long as
that conduct has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.29 The CCR bill,
which allows persons possessing an out-of-state concealed carry permit to
carry a concealed weapon in a jurisdiction that otherwise allows at least some
concealed carry, would at first blush satisfy the substantial effects
requirement.
But the matter is cloudier than that. Most foundationally, in United
States v. Lopez,30 the Court applied more stringent review under the
substantial effects requirement because the activity in question was noneconomic.31 Lopez’s analysis is especially pertinent to CCR legislation,
since the activity deemed non-economic in Lopez was the possession of a
gun. In Lopez, the Court held that Congress could regulate such noneconomic activity under the substantial effects prong of the commerce power
only if (1) the regulated activity “is an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated;”32 (2) the statute “contains [a]
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry,
that the [regulated activity] in question affects interstate commerce;33 or (3)
Congress provided findings that revealed a link between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce.34
In a later case the Court sharply restricted the probative value of
congressional findings.35 Moreover, the CCR bill is not “an essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity,” unlike, for example, the Controlled
Substances Act’s (CSA’s) ban on local possession of controlled substances,
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 41 Side B
02/26/2019 14:13:21

28. See National Federation of Indep. Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding
that the commerce power did not justify enactment of the Affordable Care Act); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the commerce power did not justify the Violence
Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the commerce
power did not justify the Gun Free Schools Zones Act).
29. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2006) (upholding a federal prosecution for local
cultivation and possession of marijuana, under the federal Controlled Substances Act). The
commerce power also allows Congress to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. The CCR bill likely does not fall under either of these
categories, except as a necessary consequence of satisfying the “jurisdictional element” prong of
the substantial effects requirement, as described in the text.
30. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
31. See id. at 559–63.
32. Id. at 561.
33. Id. at 561.
34. See id. at 562.
35. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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36. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2006).
37. H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101(a) (2017).
38. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (a jurisdictional element “may establish that the enactment
is in pursuance of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce”) (emphasis added).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1986).
40. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
41. See Jones, 529 U.S.at 858.
42. See id. at 857–58.

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 42 Side A

which the Court observed was an essential part of the CSA’s wide-ranging
regulation of interstate trafficking in illicit drugs.36
This leaves the so-called “jurisdictional element” or “jurisdictional
hook” element from Lopez. Indeed, the CCR bill’s drafters appear to have
been aware of this mechanism for invoking Congress’s commerce power,
since they provided for reciprocal concealed carry rights only for guns that
had traveled in interstate commerce.37 Thus, the strongest Commerce Clause
argument for congressional authority to enact the CCR bill rests on the force
of the bill’s jurisdictional element.
But the jurisdictional element argument is not a sure-fire winner. First,
the Court itself has suggested that insertion of a jurisdictional element does
not necessarily guarantee the constitutionality of a federal statute under the
Commerce Clause.38 It seems to have understood its own statement as a
warning that particular applications of a jurisdictional hook may be so
tenuous as to raise constitutional problems. For example, the Court itself
gave a limiting interpretation to a federal arson statute that by its terms
featured a jurisdictional element via its application only to “any building,
vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign
commerce.”39 In Jones v. United States,40 the Court rejected application of
this law to punish the arson of a private home. It rejected the government’s
argument that the statute’s jurisdictional hook (the “used in interstate or
foreign commerce” language) was satisfied because the home was secured
by a mortgage from an out-of-state lender, was insured by an out-of-state
insurance firm, and received natural gas from out of state. It did so in part
because of the traditional rule of lenity governing criminal law;41 more
relevantly for our purposes, however, it relied primarily on the constitutional
avoidance canon, citing the constitutional issue it warned would arise under
the Commerce Clause were the statute read as broadly as the government
urged.42 Thus, a jurisdictional hook by itself would not suffice to render any
given application of federal law constitutional under the Commerce Clause
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when satisfaction of that hook would threaten the values the Court has found
in that clause.43
Some lower courts have also limited the significance of a law’s
jurisdictional hook when performing Commerce Clause analysis. For
example, in United States v. Patton,44 the Tenth Circuit held that a federal
law that prohibited convicted felons from possessing body armor that was
sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce failed to satisfy any of the
three Lopez categories for valid Commerce Clause regulation.45 Writing for
the panel opinion, Judge McConnell wrote that a” jurisdictional hook is
not . . . a talisman that wards off constitutional challenges.”46 He observed
that the jurisdictional hook in the body armor law “does not seriously limit
the reach of the statute.”47 Given that the defendant’s possession of the
armor was non-economic, intrastate activity, and that the statute was not an
essential part of a broader federal scheme of regulation of interstate
commerce, he concluded that his possession did not substantially affect
interstate commerce.48
To be sure, as Judge McConnell explained, a jurisdictional element
does influence Clause analysis. He wrote, “the principal practical
consequence of a jurisdictional hook is to make a facial constitutional
challenge unlikely or impossible, and to direct litigation toward the question
of whether, in the particular case, the regulated conduct possesses the
requisite connection to interstate commerce.”49 Following this analysis, the

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 42 Side B
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43. See, e.g., id. at 858 (noting the Court’s concern in United States v. Lopez about federal
regulation of subjects traditionally regulated by states, and expressing concern that a broad reading
of the federal arson statute would implicate that concern).
44. 451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006).
45. Nevertheless, the court upheld the felon’s conviction under the body armor statute,
following pre-Lopez Supreme Court precedent that had assumed its constitutionality, even if several
lower court decisions after Lopez questioned the viability of that assumption. See id. at 636
(upholding congressional power to enact the statute under the authority of the pre-Lopez precedent);
id. at 635 (acknowledging lower court uncertainty about the continued viability of that precedent).
46. Id. at 632.
47. Id. at 633.
A purely nominal jurisdictional requirement, that some entity or object involved
in the crime be drawn from interstate commerce, does nothing to prevent the
shifting of [the federal/state] balance in favor of the federal government. As has
been amply demonstrated, virtually all criminal actions in the United States
involve the use of some object that has passed through interstate commerce.
Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal
Criminal Law, 31 COLUM J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 113 (1998).
48. Again, though, the court upheld the defendant’s conviction on the strength of the Supreme
Court’s pre-Lopez precedent assuming the statute’s constitutionality. See supra text accompanying
note 45.
49. Patton, 451 F.3d at 633.
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50. Patton, 451 F.3d at 633 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(35)).
51. Id.
52. Cf. St. Laurent, supra note 47 (noting the ubiquity in criminal conduct of materials that
at some point had crossed state lines).
53. Notably, while Judge McConnell concluded that there was no “rational basis” for
concluding that possession of the body armor the statute regulated substantially affected interstate
commerce, he appears to have applied more searching scrutiny than that normally associated with
rational basis review. Patton, 451 F.3d at 634. See id. at 633 (“Where Congress has chosen to
allow production, distribution, and sale of body armor in interstate commerce, however, it is hard
to understand why possession of armor that [moves in interstate commerce] is more objectionable
than any other.”).

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 43 Side A

existence of a jurisdictional hook in the reciprocal concealed carry bill would
likely shift the focus of Commerce Clause analysis to individual instances of
persons seeking to use an issuing state’s concealed carry permit in a host
state, using a gun that had moved in interstate commerce at some point.
When so presented, the question becomes the strength of the interstate
commerce connection to the particular gun that particular permit holder
wished to carry. Suppose, for example, that a holder of a Nevada concealed
carry permit traveled to California and sought to carry a gun that had moved
in interstate commerce fifty years earlier. In Patton, Judge McConnell
dismissed the limiting effect of the body armor statute’s jurisdictional
hook—that is, the statute’s requirement that the armor the felon could not
possess have been “sold or offered for sale, in interstate or foreign
commerce.”50 In evaluating whether that provision meaningfully limited the
law’s scope, he used language that could easily translate into the CCR
context: “Nearly all body armor will meet that test. More important, there is
no reason to think that possession of body armor that satisfies the
jurisdictional hook has any greater effect on interstate commerce than
possession of any other body armor.”51
As suggested by the example above, much the same could be said of
H.R. 38’s jurisdictional hook. Except for guns that were actually
manufactured in the host state and that never crossed a state boundary, any
gun that a permit holder might wish to carry in a host state would satisfy the
bill’s requirement.52 Cases such as Patton suggest that such attenuated
connections to interstate commerce might not suffice to create the substantial
effects Lopez requires to justify federal regulation of that particular instance
of concealed carry.
These are, admittedly, difficult arguments to embrace by those who
favor strong federal regulatory power. Calling for courts to scrutinize
jurisdictional hooks more carefully, as Judge McConnell did in Patton,53
might call into question a whole range of federal laws, particularly
environmental laws, that regulate local activities if they are found to have
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some connection to interstate commerce.54 The challenge this possibility
poses to advocates of both federal power and reasonable gun regulation
echoes the analogous challenge pro-choice advocates faced when deciding
whether to challenge the federal partial-birth abortion ban on Commerce
Clause grounds.55 Indeed, that concern might increase when one encounters
not just Judge McConnell’s (and others’) concern about any jurisdictional
hook’s broad sweep, but also, in turn, the policy skepticism that breadth
inspired him to express.56 Given that standing to challenge a CCR law would
likely be limited to states seeking to resist having to honor out-of-state
concealed carry permits, the state attorneys general who would have to craft
the arguments would likely confront the broader political and jurisprudential
concerns of embracing a broad argument against federal regulatory power.
Thus, the concern about embracing an argument that might create
undesirable consequences in other contexts would be a real one, felt by those
who would be responsible for bringing the legal challenge in the first place.

B. The Enforcement Power
Another seemingly obvious source for Congress’s power to enact CCR
legislation is its power to enforce the Second Amendment, as incorporated
to apply against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.57 However, extant
Second Amendment doctrine, to which a CCR bill must be substantively
related in order to constitute valid enforcement legislation, raises doubts
about such a bill’s Enforcement Clause foundation. Even more glaringly, so
does the very nature of the right CCR legislation would confer.

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 43 Side B
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54. On the other hand, it might be possible to distinguish away more stringent applications
of the jurisdictional element prong when considering challenges to environmental statutes, if in
such challenges the identification of particular instances of the regulated activity is more
difficult given the interconnected nature of ecosystems, species populations, and airsheds and
watersheds. See, e.g., GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003)
(“Although . . . there is no express jurisdictional element in [the Endangered Species Act’s [ESA’s]
prohibition on takings of endangered species], our analysis of the interdependence of species
compels the conclusion that regulated takes under ESA do affect interstate commerce.”). Cf.
National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1049 (D.C. Cir.1997), cert denied,
524 U.S. 937 (1998) (“A class of activities can substantially affect interstate commerce regardless
of whether the activity at issue—in this case the taking of endangered species—is commercial or
noncommercial.”).
55. See, e.g., Jordan Goldberg, The Commerce Clause and Federal Abortion Law: Why
Progressives Might Be Tempted to Embrace Federalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (2006) (setting
forth this challenge).
56. Patton, 451 F.3d at 633 (“More important [than the broad sweep of the body armor
statute’s jurisdictional hook], there is no reason to think that possession of body armor that satisfies
the jurisdictional hook has any greater effect on interstate commerce than possession of any other
body armor.”).
57. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 541 U.S. 742 (2010).
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1. Judicial Doctrine

The first—and, to date, essentially the only58—place to look for
Supreme Court doctrine on the scope of the Second Amendment right is its
2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.59 As readers will know,
Heller held that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to
firearm possession, rather than a collective right grounded in militia service.
The five-justice majority, speaking through Justice Scalia, relied heavily on
originalist methodology to reach this decision (as did Justice Stevens’
dissent, which also used historical materials to reach the opposite
conclusion).60
In the course of reaching that conclusion, the majority opinion made
several remarks suggesting that the Second Amendment right does not
include a right to concealed carry. When reviewing Nineteenth century
decisions construing state constitutional analogues to the Second
Amendment, the Court cited several such decisions that upheld bans on
concealed carry.61 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s use of the concealed carry issue
to illustrate his more general point that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured
by the Second Amendment is not unlimited”62 comes very close to a
statement that the Second Amendment does not guarantee a right to
concealed carry,63 even if the Court did not actually say it.64
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58. The only other Second Amendment cases the Court has decided since deciding that the
Amendment guarantees an individual right to possess firearms are McDonald, which simply
incorporated the Second Amendment right as set forth in Heller to apply against the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S.Ct. 1027 (2016), which rejected a
state court’s conclusion that a stun gun was not covered by the Second Amendment. Caetano does
add something to Supreme Court firearms rights doctrine, and is discussed later. See infra text
accompanying notes 80-82. But See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted, N.Y. State Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n v. City of N.Y., No. 18-280, (Jan. 22, 2019).
59. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
60. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009) (discussing this aspect of the opinions in Heller).
61. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 613 (discussing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840)); id. at 626
(citing State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 3858 (La. 1858) and Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846)); id.
(concluding that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state
analogues”).
62. Id. at 626.
63. See, e.g., Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry For All: Heller and Our Nineteenth Century
Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J.1486, 1995 (describing this statement as “about as close as
dictum can get”).
64. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (by contrast, the Court did say that restrictions on certain
types of persons possessing firearms, possession of firearms in certain locations, and restrictions
on firearms sales, were constitutional).
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Several lower courts have read Heller and the history upon which it
relied to warrant a conclusion that, indeed, the Second Amendment does not
confer a right to concealed carry.65 However, this reading creates a problem
when one considers the relationship between concealed carry and public
carry. Assuming, as Heller seems to imply, that there may be some right to
public carriage of a weapon,66 that carriage must take the form of either open
carry (that is, the open display of a firearm on one’s person) or concealed
carry. Given Heller’s apparent approval of restrictions and even bans on
concealed carry,67 it follows that if, as Heller also implies, the Second
Amendment protects some measure of public carry, that carry must be public
if the jurisdiction chooses to ban concealed carry.
To be sure, many jurisdictions, if required to choose, would probably
choose to allow concealed rather than open carry.68 This choice would be
relevant for the effective reach of a CCR law, since the reciprocal concealed
carry right would only apply in jurisdictions that allowed some measure of
concealed carry. For Second Amendment enforcement purposes, however,
the more formalistic fact would be the relevant one: the Second Amendment
does not appear to grant to a right to concealed carry per se.
2. Congressional Enforcement Power

In other writing I have considered the general question of Congress’s
power to enforce the Second Amendment.69 To briefly summarize a
complicated question, any such enforcement legislation must satisfy the
“congruence and proportionality” standard set forth in the now-foundational
1997 case City of Boerne v. Flores.70 Boerne and the major enforcement
power cases that came after it71 stated and applied a requirement that
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 44 Side B
02/26/2019 14:13:21

65. E.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (citing
other courts reaching the same conclusion); Petersen v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1211 (10th Cir.
2013) (same).
66. See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2014)
(observing that since Heller spoke of home possession as the “core” Second Amendment right,
there must necessarily be a “non-core” right to public possession), rev’d, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.
2016) (en banc); id. at 1153 (arguing that Heller’s statement about the presumptive constitutionality
of firearms possession restrictions in certain sensitive public places implies that public possession
of guns in non-sensitive places is constitutionally protected at least to some degree).
67. See supra cases cited note 61.
68. See, e.g., supra note 11 (explaining why jurisdictions may make this choice by illustrating
the public fear that accompanies instances of open carry).
69. See William D. Araiza, Arming the Second Amendment—And Enforcing the Fourteenth,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017) [hereinafter Araiza, Arming].
70. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
71. See Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Savings Plan v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 666
(1999) (striking down a patent rights law’s application to state infringers as exceeding the
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enforcement legislation reflect some non-trivial relationship to the
underlying Fourteenth Amendment right the legislation sought to enforce.72
In applying that requirement, which Boerne expressed through its
“congruence and proportionality” formula, the Court has relied heavily on
judicial decisions in Fourteenth Amendment cases as creating the focal point
for congruence and proportionality review. In addition, the Court has often
insisted that enforcement legislation closely track the contours of the right
announced in those decisions.73 In other writing I have criticized this
approach to congruence and proportionality review.74 In that writing, I argue
that such review should use as its focal point underlying constitutional
meaning rather than judicial doctrine, since judicial doctrine may reflect

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 45 Side A
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enforcement power); Kimel v. Board of Trustees, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that the enforcement
power did not give Congress the power to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to
state government employers); Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the
enforcement power did not give Congress the power to apply the employment provisions of the
Americans With Disabilities Act to state government employers); Nevada Dept. of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding application of the family leave provisions of
the Family and Medical Leave Act to state government employers under the enforcement power);
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding application of the public services provisions
of the Americans With Disabilities Act to states as applied to the right to access courthouses);
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (holding that the enforcement
power did not give Congress the power to apply the personal leave provisions of the Family and
Medical Leave Act to state government employers); see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S.
151 (2006) (upholding application of the public services provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act under the enforcement power, as applied to claims made by a state prisoner that
the state’s alleged conduct violating the ADA also violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (holding that Congress’s power to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment did not authorize it to re-authorize the preclearance provisions
of the Voting Rights Act).
72. At least one commenter views Boerne as providing significantly more leeway for
enforcement legislation, including CCR legislation. National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of
2011: Hearings Before the United States House of Representatives Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security, Of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 11–12 (2011) (Testimony of
David B. Kopel, Adjunct Professor, Denver University Sturm College of the Law) [hereinafter
Kopel Testimony]. Even assuming this analysis reflects a correct reading of Boerne—something
that is difficult to evaluate given its brief analysis of a complex case—it neglects to consider postBoerne cases that have usually applied congruence and proportionality review significantly more
stringently. See supra cases cited note 71 and infra sources cited note 73.
73. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003) (illustrating examples of such
stringent enforcement power scrutiny); William D. Araiza, New Groups and Old Doctrine:
Rethinking Congressional Power to Enforce the Equal Protection Clause, 37 FLA. STATE L. REV.
451, 466–68 (2010) [hereinafter Araiza, New Groups]; WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114–117 (NYU PRESS 2016) [hereafter ARAIZA, ENFORCING] (all same).
74. See Araiza, New Groups, supra note 73; ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 73; William
D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal Protection, 79 TULANE
L. REV. 519 (2005); William D. Araiza, The Enforcement Power in Crisis, 18 U. PA. J. CON. L.
ONLINE 1 (2015).
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75. This statement slightly overstates the effect of the CCR bill, as it requires that any such
permit-carrier not be otherwise prohibited by federal law from possessing a concealed weapon. See
H.R. 38, § 101 (a) (a).
76. But see supra note 75.
77. See generally infra Part III (B) (arguing that the CCR bill would violate the nondelegation doctrine, in part based on this lack of substantive standards).
78. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (concluding that a provision of the
Colorado Constitution denying any protected status on the basis of same-sex or bisexual orientation
“confounds” traditional equal protection review by being simultaneously too broad and too narrow,
and thus making it impossible for the Court to test it for compliance with the foundational
requirement that all laws have at least a rational connection to a legitimate government interest).
79. Id. (identifying an analogous problem with a similarly-unusual statute).
80. Cf. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (holding that Massachusetts’ law
banning most possessions of stun guns violated the Second Amendment).
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institutional competence and democratic legitimacy concerns specific to
courts that have no proper place in evaluating congressional work-product
enacted under the enforcement power.
How would congruence and proportionality review, as practiced by the
Court, play out with regard to CCR legislation? Would such review, as I
argue it should be practiced, yield a different result? The answer to the first
of these questions—the more practically relevant one—casts doubt on the
enforcement power bona fides of such a law. So does the second.
Analysis of this first question—that is, whether a CCR law would be
congruent and proportional to the Second Amendment right under the
Court’s current approach to congruence and proportionality review—is
immediately plagued by the oddity of the right a CCR law would confer.
Such a law would, by its terms, simply mandate nationwide reciprocal
validity of any concealed carry permit issued by any state.75 It would not
enact any substantive federal concealed carry policy,76 or set any federal
standards for the kinds of concealed carry permits issued by one state that
the other 49 states would have to respect. In a real way, the CCR bill sets no
substantive federal gun policy at all.77
This lack of a substantive federal gun rights policy, in the context of a
putative enforcement statute, “confounds”78 conventional congruence and
proportionality analysis. The bill’s lack of such a policy makes it impossible
to perform the comparative measuring task—that is, the measuring of the
law for “congruence” and “proportionality” to the right the law sought to
enforce—that is central to Boerne’s approach.79 As such, it simply cannot
be understood as appropriate legislation under Boerne’s approach.
This conclusion would hold even if it were shown that states were
engaging in serious violations of the Second Amendment right as the Court
understood it.80 For example, Heller at least implies that the Second
Amendment might provide some protection for self-defense-justified
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possessions of guns in public, both by describing the home as the place where
the “core” Second Amendment was “most acute” (thus suggesting other
locations where the need might exist, even if in a “less acute” form)81 and by
its endorsement of prohibitions on carrying guns in certain “sensitive
places,” thus suggesting that other, “less sensitive,” places might be venues
for constitutionally-protected carriage.82 Yet the CCR bill would provide no
substantive protection for public concealed carriage of a gun, other that
whatever protection a given state may choose to provide, which would then
become close to a de facto national standard via the reciprocity
requirement.83
To be sure, one can speculate about the likely effects of a CCR law on
the substantive landscape of concealed carry rights in the United States. For
example, one might examine particularly permissive jurisdictions today and
use their concealed carry rules as the relevant enforcement statute input into
the congruence and proportionality calculus. Such speculation, however, is
just that—speculation. For example, we could not know whether, in face of
nationwide reciprocity, such permissive jurisdictions would take steps to
limit the availability of concealed carry permits to their own citizens. But
even were we to know with precision the concealed carry policies states
eventually adopted in the face of a CCR law, the more important objection
to that entire line of enforcement power analysis is that that enforcement
statute itself would not be the source of any such policy.
This should be enough to rebut the enforcement power argument. But
if it were not, it bears realizing that an enforcement power argument for the
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81. See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The [Heller]
Court . . . clarif[ied] that the need for the [firearm possession for self-defense] right is “most acute”
in the home, thus implying that the right exists outside the home, though the need is not always as
‘acute.’”); id. (concluding that such statements from Heller, though short of dispositive, strongly
suggest that the Second Amendment secures a right to carry a firearm in some fashion outside the
home).
82. See supra text accompanying note 66 (citing an appellate opinion adopting this
reasoning). One might read Caetano as more explicit support for the proposition that gun rights
extend into the public, given that the individual in that case was arrested for possessing a stun gun
in public). See Caetano,136 S. Ct. at 1028, 1028 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (recounting
the facts of the case). However, because the state court had simply categorically excluded stun
guns from Second Amendment protection in upholding a state law completely prohibiting their
possession, the Court did not reach the public possession question).
83. To be sure, a quite permissive concealed carry state may restrict the availability of
concealed carry permits to its own citizens, thus avoiding becoming the desired venue for obtaining
such permits nationwide and thus the source for the de facto national standard. But a state would
be under no obligation to impose such limits, and under the CCR bill every other state that allowed
some form of concealed carry would have to honor that issuing state’s permits, even if the holder
of the permit possesses the gun in her home state and would not have qualified for a permit under
her home state’s law. See Shearer, supra note 5, at 433 (noting this point).
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CCR bill turns the Enforcement Clause on its head. The enforcement power
is a federal power designed to empower Congress to ensure that states act in
conformance with the Fourteenth Amendment. An enforcement statute that
delegated to the states themselves the power to determine what the Second
Amendment demands violates that underlying understanding of what the
Enforcement Clause, and more generally the Fourteenth Amendment, sought
to accomplish.84 Indeed, the reciprocity feature that is central to CCR
legislation renders the headstand even starker, since it effectively allows one
or a small number of states to determine what the Fourteenth Amendment
requires and to impose that understanding on the other states.85
This analysis applies regardless of whether the Court applies its
standard approach to Boerne—one that gives dominant effect to its own
court-announced doctrine when establishing the constitutional target at
which enforcement legislation must aim86—or whether it adopts a more
nuanced approach.87 A more nuanced approach would recognize that courtannounced constitutional doctrine may reflect underenforcement of the
relevant constitutional provision, due to epistemic anxieties the Court may
have or simply a respect for states’ democratic political processes.88 This
recognition in turn might justify a broader congressional role in enacting
enforcement legislation, given Congress’s equal—and, indeed, broader—
democratic pedigree as compared to state legislatures, and its superior factfinding capabilities as compared to federal courts.89
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84. What appellant ignores is that Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision,
has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The power to ‘enforce’ may at times also include the power to define
situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt
prophylactic rules to deal with those situations.
Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880) (The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments “were
intended to be, what they really are, limitations of the powers of the States and enlargements of the
power of Congress.”).
85. See supra note 83 (explaining how a CCR law could lead to that result).
86. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 73, at 113–23 (explaining the Court’s standard
approach to congruence and proportionality review).
87. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 73 at 141–206 (explaining and arguing for a more
nuanced approach to congruence and proportionality review).
88. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (classic statement of the idea that judicial
doctrine may be properly understood as not stating the full extent of constitutional rights).
89. See ARAIZA, ENFORCING, supra note 73, at 169–93; William D. Araiza, Deference to
Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 878 (2013); Caitlin Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights
Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1185 (2013); Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth
Constitutional Decision-Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2013).
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But even under this more nuanced approach to the enforcement power,
CCR legislation would flounder because of the lack of a substantive standard
in that law. Simply put, any application of congruence and proportionality
review requires that the enforcement statute feature a substantive policy, in
order for it to be subject to coherent testing against the constitutional
baseline, however court-centric (or not) that baseline is.90 CCR legislation
simply lacks such a substantive policy. As such, it cannot be considered
legitimate enforcement legislation.91
There is much more to say about Congress’s authority to enforce the
Second Amendment.92 The question is important: the gun rights issue elicits
strong feelings on both sides of the debate, and the two sides map neatly onto
the nation’s current sharp geographical/political divide. This means that
there exist simultaneously different gun regulation regimes across the
nation93 and strong impetus toward enacting national legislation, a logical
foundation for at least some of which would be the enforcement power.
Thus, it behooves scholars to continue thinking about the enforcement power
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90. See supra notes 86-87 (citing sources explaining, respectively, more and less courtcentered approaches to congruence and proportionality review).
91. The argument that CCR legislation could somehow be thought of as enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment right to travel requires little discussion. As stated by one proponent of this
theory, the theory would be that Congress could decide to protect the right to interstate travel by
making it safer by allowing out-of-state travelers to possess weapons pursuant to their home states’
laws. See Kopel Testimony, supra note 72, at 5–6.
Whether the right in question is a right to travel interstate without encountering “unreasonable”
state-imposed burdens, or, alternatively, a right to sojourn in a state free from any unreasonable
discrimination based on the visitor’s out-of-state status, see Kopel Testimony, supra note 72 at 5–
6; it is close to impossible to see how giving the visitor a special right—a right to carry a weapon
pursuant to his home state’s laws, rather than simply the right to carry a weapon pursuant to the
laws of the state he visits—constitutes an “appropriate,” U.S. CONST. amend. 14 § 5, enforcement
of that right. Leave aside the seemingly obvious doctrinal objections to calling “unreasonable” or
“discriminatory” a state gun law that otherwise complied with the Second Amendment (as the host
state’s law would have to be assumed to do) and imposed the same requirements on resident and
visitor alike. Rather, consider the implications. If a CCR statute was held to be appropriate
enforcement legislation enforcing this right, query, for example, whether Congress could also
enforce the interstate travel right by mandating that a visitor from a state with a highly protective
“stand your ground” law could assert that right when traveling in a state with a less protective law.
The highly likely answer to that latter question—an emphatic “no”—would presumably require the
same result for a right-to-travel enforcement defense of CCR legislation.
92. See, e.g., Araiza, Arming supra note 69; Christopher Schmidt, Originalism and
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33 (2018)
(responding to that article); Darrell A. H. Miller, Dignity and Second Amendment Enforcement—
Response to William D. Araiza’s Arming the Second Amendment and Enforcing the Fourteenth, 75
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 438 (2018) (same).
93. To be sure, Heller and McDonald together mean that these different regimes are all
subject to a federal constitutional floor, which mitigates at least some of the divergence noted in
the text.
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in the context of the Second Amendment. The legitimate scope of that power
poses a difficult question. However, the status of a CCR law as Second
Amendment enforcement legislation does not.

C. The Full Faith and Credit Guarantee
A final potential source of constitutional authority for Congress to enact
CCR legislation is its power under the Full Faith and Credit guarantee of
Article IV, Section 1.94 As a general matter, that provision speaks to the
effect sister states must give to a state’s official pronouncements and
decisions. Given the gist of CCR legislation as designed to force states to
honor another state’s concealed carry permits, one can easily understand why
this provision—and, in particular, Congress’s powers under it—have been
cited as a possible source of authority for such a law.95
While the first sentence of Section 1, the so-called “Full Faith and
Credit” Clause, prescribes a self-executing rule, the provision’s relevance for
CCR legislation lies in its second sentence, known as the “Effects” Clause.
The Effects Clause provides that “the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which [the public] Acts, Records and Proceedings
[referred to in the first sentence] shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”
The relevance of the Effects Clause power to CCR legislation implicates a
variety of issues, some of which have not been conclusively established and
about which there remains significant scholarly disagreement. This sub-Part
merely identifies those issues, without purporting to offer a definitive
analysis of them.
1. The Provision’s Subjects

02/26/2019 14:13:21

94. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may be general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1.
95. See Letter from Stephen Sachs, Professor of Law Duke University School of Law, Randy
Barnett, Director of Georgetown Center for the Constitution at Georgetown University Law Center,
and William Baude, Assistant Professor of Law Chicago Law School to the Hons. Trey Gowdy,
Richard
Hudson,
and
Justin
Amash
(March
23,
2017),
reprinted
at
http://www.stevesachs.com/HR38_SachsBarnettBaudeLtr_20170323.pdf (urging that Congress
rely on this power for CCR legislation).
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At first blush, the first question—what are “public Acts, Records and
Proceedings”?—is perhaps susceptible to a fairly clear answer. As Professor
Ralph Whitten, a leading scholar of the full faith and credit provision, notes,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause itself (and thus the subsequent Effects
Clause) applies to “the public acts (or statutes), non-judicial records, and
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judicial proceedings (or judgments) of each state.”96 But ambiguities
immediately cloud this seemingly straightforward (and comprehensive)
accounting of the items subject to the full faith and credit provision. Those
definitional ambiguities (and others, as noted below) arose from the debate
over same-sex marriage in the two decades between Hawaii’s first tentative
steps toward same-sex marriage rights97 and Obergefell v. Hodges’s98
nationalization of that right. In particular, they arose in the context of the
debate about what, if anything, the Full Faith and Credit Clause said about
states’ obligations to honor out-of-state same-sex marriages99 and about
whether Congress could use the Effects Clause to authorize states to refuse
to honor such marriages.100
With regard to the class of state actions that are subject to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, Professor Whitten questioned the status of a marriage
license as a “record” that was subject to the Clause. Instead, he suggested, a
marriage license or any other state-granted license101 “is simply evidence of
some right or privilege granted by the laws of a state.” Thus, according to
Professor Whitten, if a person who (pre-Obergefell) entered into a same-sex
marriage in State A sought State B’s recognition of the marriage license State
A granted him, the full faith and credit argument for such recognition would
rest on State B’s obligation to give full faith and credit to State A’s “public
Acts.”102
Of course, the significance, if any, of the difference between a state’s
obligation to give full faith and credit to another state’s “Records” and its
obligation to give full faith and credit to a state’s “public Acts” depends on
the significance of its respective underlying obligations. This sub-Part now
turns briefly to that question.
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 48 Side A
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96. Ralph U. Whitten, Full Faith and Credit for Dummies, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 465, 466
(2005).
97. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that Hawaii could ban same-sex
couples from marrying only if that prohibition could satisfy strict scrutiny).
98. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
99. Compare, e.g., David Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Marriages, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 7
(1997) (concluding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require states to honor out-of-state
solemnized same-sex marriages) with Evan Wolfson & Michael Meicher, A House Divided: An
Argument Against the Defense of Marriage Act, 58 OR. STATE BAR BULLETIN 17, 17–18 (1998)
(suggesting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause might require states to honor such marriages).
100. See infra note 117 (citing scholarly analyses coming to differing conclusions on the
Effects Clause question with regard to DOMA).
101. See Whitten, supra note 96, at 477. Indeed, Professor Whitten used a concealed carry
license as his example.
102. See id. at 479 (“I hope that enough has been said to convince the reader that the issue of
concern in interjurisdictional marriage enforcement cases is full faith and credit to state public
acts . . . .”).
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103. Jeffrey M. Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of Full Faith and Credit, 20 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 485, 487 (2013).
104. See Whitten, supra note 96.
105. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20 (1997).
106. See supra text accompanying note 102 (noting Professor Whitten’s suggestion to this
effect in the analogous context of marriage licenses).
107. See supra text accompanying note 102 (noting Professor Whitten’s suggestion to this
effect in the analogous context of marriage licenses).
108. Id.
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Scholars disagree on the obligations that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause imposes on states. As one recent review of the scholarship explained,
“Until recently, most modern scholarship on the Full Faith and Credit
Clause . . . accepted the premise, found in the Supreme Court’s precedent,
that the first portion of the Clause provided a substantive command requiring
states to give conclusive effect to state judgments and—in certain
situations—to state acts.”103 In particular, that traditional view has
distinguished between a sister state’s judicial judgments and its laws (or
“public Acts”),104 with the former subject to a much stricter constitutional
insistence on sister-state enforcement.105
Thus, to the extent concealed carry licenses are best understood as
public Acts, as Professor Whitten suggests,106 the traditional view would
suggest that any substantive requirement the Clause imposes is less stringent
than the analogous requirement as applied to a judicial judgment. If one
accepts all of (1) Professor Whitten’s definitional analysis, (2) the traditional
view of the Clause’s substantive force but also (3) its relatively weaker
impact on “public Acts” as opposed to judgments, then it is at least possible
that an Effects Clause statute requiring enforcement of another state’s
concealed carry permits might face stronger constitutional headwinds—or at
least less of a presumption of constitutionality. This is a highly speculative
argument, however.
Regardless, the traditional view has come under attack. As the review
cited above went on to explain, “[a] growing number of scholars”107 have
come to question the idea that the Clause has a substantive impact. Instead,
those scholars argue that the Clause’s self-executing force lay simply in its
mandate that states admit such “public Acts, Records and judicial
Proceedings” “as conclusive proof that such proceedings took place (i.e., as
conclusive proof that the court of another state rendered such a judgment or
that the legislature of another state passed such an act).”108 Thus, on this
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theory, the self-executing force of the Clause simply amounts to an
evidentiary rule.109
As noted above, the outcome of this debate could conceivably bear on
the extent of Congress’s power under the Effects Clause. Because a full
analysis of this debate is far beyond its scope, this Article brackets [it], and
moves on to focus explicitly on the Effects Clause.
3. Congressional Power Under the Effects Clause

02/26/2019 14:13:21

109. See, e.g., Whitten, supra note 96, at 466 (“Translated into modern parlance, the first
sentence of the clause commanded that the public acts (or statutes), non-judicial records, and
judicial proceedings (or judgments) of each state had to be admitted into evidence as conclusive
proof of their own existence and contents–i.e., as proof that such a statute, record, or judgment
actually existed and dealt with the matters contained in the (properly authenticated) copy of the
statute, record, or judgment presented to the court that was being asked to recognize it.”); Stephen
E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (2009) “[T]he
only self-executing portion of the Clause was evidentiary in nature: it obliged states to admit sisterstate records into evidence but did not mandate the substantive effect those records should have.”).
110. See, e.g., Wolfson & Meicher, supra note 99, at 18 (noting that prior to 1996 Congress
had only invoked this power on four occasions, two of which involved legislation that simply
prescribed methods for authenticating sister states’ official records).
111. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
112. See infra text accompanying note 152 (noting the practical relevance of this question for
the Effects Clause foundation for the prima facie evidence provision); see also Shearer, supra note
5, at 439–40 (noting the potential difficulties police officers might face when having to apply this
provision).
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The question of Congress’s power under the second sentence of the
Clause is clouded by the fact that Congress has very rarely invoked it.110 As
a result, courts have had few occasions to opine on and establish its scope.
The text of the Effects Clause suggests that Congress’s power is broad
indeed. It authorizes Congress both to “prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,” and also to “prescribe . . .
the Effect thereof.”111 With regard to the first of these powers, one might
initially think that it provides ample authority for subsection (c)(1)’s
provision that possession of a “facially valid” identification document and
concealed carry permit constitutes “prima facie evidence” that the individual
has the federally-required state-issued license.
Still, this argument is not free of ambiguity. The context for the Effects
Clause was likely anticipated to be a state’s judicial process, not an on-thestreet law enforcement action where this provision of subsection (c)(1)
would likely be most frequently employed.112 Moreover, if the Full Faith
and Credit Clause guarantees the conclusive authenticity of a sister state’s
records, one might argue that subsection (c)(1)’s provision for more tentative
authentication is an odd fit with—and thus perhaps an inappropriate use of—
the Effects Clause’s grant of power to vindicate the earlier Clause’s self-
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113. Koppelman, supra note 105, at 20 (quoting Professor McConnell’s letter to Congress as
it was considering the Defense of Marriage Act).
114 See text accompanying supra note 112 (providing one example of this issue).
115. See id. at 19 (quoting Professor Tribe’s letter to Congress as it was considering the same
legislation that motivated Professor McConnell’s letter).
116. Id. at 21.
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executing authentication. At the very least, if Congress relied on the Effects
Clause as support for this provision of subsection (c)(1), the novelty of this
type of use of the Clause would require some careful thinking on these
questions.
With regard to Congress’s power to “prescribe . . . the Effect” of those
state documents, Professor Michael McConnell has argued that that Clause’s
language provides Congress with a broad power allowing it to “prescribe that
a particular class of acts will have no effect at all, or that their effect will be
confined to their state of origin.”113 Other scholars have resisted this
argument, which is relevant both to Congress’s power to enact an arguably
weaker recognition rule than that required by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause’s self-executing requirement114 and to the scope of Congress’s power
more generally. Professor Laurence Tribe has analogized the Effects Clause
to Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that
Congress can expand a state’s full faith and credit obligation beyond the
constitutionally-required minimum, but cannot restrict it.115 Professor
Andrew Koppelman embraced that same conclusion via a textual argument.
He has argued that Congress’s power under the Effects Clause should be
interpreted in light of the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s affirmative mandate
to states to accord full faith and credit; thus, he concludes that Congress’s
power should not be read “in a way that contradicts [the prior Clause’s] selfexecuting command.”116
This discussion also played out against the backdrop of the same-sex
marriage debate of the last two decades. In this case, the Effects Clause
discussion concerned Congress’s enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), one provision of which, grounded on its power under the Effects
Clause, authorized states to refuse legal recognition to same-sex marriages
legally performed in other states. Because DOMA cabined rather than
extended the scope of states’ full faith and credit obligations, the debate over
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117. Compare, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 105 (arguing that DOMA was unconstitutional)
with Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Not Yet (?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence,
Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine What the Constitution
Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915 (2006) (reaching a tentatively opposing conclusion).
118. But see text accompanying supra note 112 (providing one example where the DOMA
model might conceivably be more directly relevant).
119. See, e.g., Koppleman, supra note 105 at 22; Rosen, supra note 117, at 934 (quoting
Professor Tribe to this effect).
120. Rosen, supra note 117, at 937.
121. See text accompanying supra note 83 (noting the standardizing effect of CCR legislation).
122. Rosen, supra note 117, at 939 (quoting Professor Tribe’s letter to Congress); see also
Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and Domestic Relations Conflicts
Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1999) (arguing that DOMA violates state sovereignty
“because it invalidates state judgments based on their content alone”).
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its constitutionality117 is not directly relevant to the analogous debate over
CCR legislation’s foundation in the Effects Clause.118
Nevertheless, the DOMA debate does reflect several considerations that
are relevant to the CCR issue. Perhaps most foundational is the question
whether the full faith and credit provision points unambiguously toward
national uniformity. Some scholars attacking DOMA’s constitutionality
suggested that it does—on that ground, they argued that DOMA’s
authorization to states to refuse to recognize other states’ same-sex marriages
was unconstitutional.119 Other scholars disagreed, citing the guarantee’s dual
goals of uniformity and state autonomy—or, as one commentator put it, “a
union of a certain kind: a union of meaningfully empowered sub-federal
polities.”120 Again, to the extent this debate played out against the backdrop
of DOMA, which sought to authorize disuniformity on the relevant question
(the legal status of same-sex marriages), the uniformity/state autonomy
distinction sounds in a different register in the CCR debate, in which the
federal law in question seeks to impose uniformity at least of a sort—that is,
uniformity via nationwide reciprocity.121
This distinct character of CCR legislation raises another question, one
that again appeared in the DOMA debate. That debate featured arguments
that DOMA, by selecting particular types of state legal actions for
unfavorable sister-state treatment, unconstitutionally singled-out certain
types of state laws for unfavorable sister-state treatment. According to
Professor Laurence Tribe, this feature of DOMA, if valid, would necessarily
mean that “Congress can pick and choose any substantive field governed by
state law . . . and render ‘any State’s official acts, on any subject, to secondclass status’ that need not receive full faith and credit, undermining the
‘Tenth Amendment’s unambiguous language, that ours is a National
Government whose powers are limited to those enumerated in the
Constitution itself.’”122

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 50 Side B

02/26/2019 14:13:21

ARAIZA_MACRO_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE)

594

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

2/15/2019 5:19 PM

[Vol. 46:3

02/26/2019 14:13:21

123. The word “favorable” is italicized to distinguish the treatment the affected state law
would receive under CCR legislation as compared with the unfavorable treatment the relevant state
law would receive in Professor Tribe’s argument against DOMA.
124. Cf. text accompanying supra note 122 (quoting a source attacking DOMA for singling
out certain states’ laws on certain topics for “second class status”); see also supra, note 123 (again
flagging this distinction).
125. To be sure, it is possible to map DOMA more precisely onto CCR legislation. One could
argue that a CCR law would cast a more gun-restrictive state’s laws into the same “second class
status” into which DOMA allegedly cast the laws of marriage-equality jurisdictions. But this
argument seems weak: Under CCR legislation a gun-restrictive state’s laws are not really being
ignored or refused effect by sister states. At most, they would simply have little practical relevance,
as gun carriers flocked to more permissive states to obtain their permits. This is not to say that
therefore the more restrictive state is not suffering an injury to its sovereign interests. But the injury
would have to be expressed differently, as set forth in the text paragraph following this footnote.
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Again, the unique effect of CCR legislation requires that we translate
these arguments. The approximate idea would be that CCR legislation, by
identifying a species of state actions (here, grants of concealed carry permits)
for particularly favorable123 full faith and credit treatment, amounts less to a
general, nationwide choice-of-law rule and more to a substantive insistence
that one state’s laws on a given topic be given “first class status.”124 So
understood, this translation reveals the fundamentally different nature of the
arguments in these two cases. Professor Tribe’s anti-DOMA argument
appears to rest on a concern that DOMA would relegate a pro-marriageequality state’s laws to “second-class status” if, as DOMA authorized, a state
could refuse to honor that state’s same-sex marriages. The analogous
concern with CCR legislation would have to be understood as the mirror
image of this argument: essentially, a CCR law would allow a permissive
concealed carry state’s laws to trump a more restrictive state’s laws, by
allowing a permissive state’s permit-holder to travel to the more restrictive
state and flout that latter state’s more stringent laws.125
The highly imperfect nature of this translation (indeed, its character as
the mirror image of the anti-DOMA argument) means that we would need to
think hard about whether CCR legislation would impact state sovereign
prerogatives to the same degree Professor Tribe alleged that DOMA did.
Presumably, the analogous potential constitutional flaw CCR legislation
would lie in the principle, reflected in the Tenth Amendment, that within its
sphere of authority a state retains the prerogative to regulate its citizenry as
it (and its citizenry) see fit. Of course, this principle would be subject to
federal power to preempt such choices, if the constitutional authority for such
preemption exists. Thus, just as one participant in the DOMA debate
correctly observed in that context, the Tenth Amendment argument in the
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CCR context would collapse back on the question whether the Effects Clause
authorized CCR legislation.126
This last insight suggests that debates about the extent of Congress’s
power under the Effects Clause might degenerate into an unhelpful
circularity. But the circle could be broken. First, the Effects Clause’s
explicit proviso that such federal legislation take the form of “general
laws”127 might be read as requiring that Effects Clause legislation be what
one commenter on DOMA called “content neutral”128—that is, less explicitly
focused on one regulatory area. Another participant in the DOMA debate,
one generally critical of this argument, nevertheless conceded that it rested
on a “plausible textual basis.”129 If accepted, this argument would
presumably cast serious doubt on the Effects Clause foundation for CCR
legislation.130
Second, such circularity could be broken by a judicial decision that
embraces a substantive vision of federalism that is inconsistent with the
effect of CCR legislation. This vision might simply insist that, whatever the
Effects Clause authorizes, it does not allow Congress to override any state’s
legitimate police power regulation by insisting that that state apply another
state’s law simpliciter.131 This vision is not implausible. After all, the Court
in United States v. Lopez never denied that possession of a gun in a school
zone in fact affected interstate commerce; instead, it held that it could not
conclude that such possession counted legally as interstate commerce subject
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126. See Rosen, supra note 117, at 939 (describing arguments like this as “parasitic on the
conclusion that the Effects Clause does not authorize Congress to enact DOMA.”).
127. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
128. Cox, supra note 122, at 1081–82.
129. Rosen, supra note 117, at 941. However, another commenter has observed that Congress
has in fact legislated under the Effects Clause to require that states honor a particular class of
judicial judgments. See Julie L.B. Johnson, The Meaning of ‘General Laws’: The Extent of
Congress’s Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense
of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1642–43 (1997) (discussing federal legislation under
the Effects Clause mandating sister-state recognition of judgments related to child support, child
custody, and protection orders); id. at 1622 n.56 (citing such laws).
130. For a discussion of the Clause’s requirement that congressional action be taken via
“general Laws,” see Johnson, supra note 129.
131. Cf. Whitten, supra note 96 (arguing that full faith and credit for items such as marriage
and concealed carry licenses should be understood in the context of full faith and credit for the laws
of the state that issue such a license). For a discussion of the question whether the Constitution
speaks to choice-of-law issues of the sort implicit in CCR reciprocity legislation, see Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of
Choice-of-Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992); id. at 251 (offering as one of three constitutional
principles governing choice of law that “the fundamental allocation of authority among states is
territorial,” and arguing that “all choice-of-law rules must be consistent with, and derived from, the
fundamentally territorial allocation of authority among the states. . . . [A] state’s claim to regulate
behavior or to govern a dispute must be based on some thing or event within its territory.”).
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to federal regulation, given the effect such a holding would have in
eviscerating any realm of regulation reserved to the states.132 Similarly, a
court might suggest that the Effects Clause simply cannot be read as
authorizing Congress to single out a particular state’s law on a particular
subject and cram it down the throats of sister states—especially when that
federal mandate would have a clear substantive effect.133
These arguments are speculative and subject to a great deal of debate.
Again, given the paucity of caselaw on the scope of Congress’s power under
the Effects Clause, they remain open questions that require careful study.

III. Constitutional Defenses
In addition to the issues Part II has sketched out, CCR legislation raises
difficult questions about what this Article calls “constitutional defenses.”
Such “defenses” do not address the preliminary question of whether a
constitutional source of authority exists for a CCR statute. Rather, they
assume such a source exists and consider instead whether such legislation
would still be unconstitutional, because it would transgress an affirmative
limit on Congress’s authority. This part of the Article addresses two such
limits: the anti-commandeering principle, and the non-delegation doctrine.

A. The Anti-Commandeering Defense
Even if a federal law reflects an otherwise-constitutional use of
Congress’s Article I powers, the possibility always remains that it violates
the federalism implications of the Tenth Amendment.134 In the case of CCR
legislation, the most notable of such limits is the anti-commandeering
concept adopted by the Court in New York v. United States.135 As readers
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 51 Side B
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132. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563–64 (1995); see also Jones v. United States,
529 U.S. 848, 858 (noting this concern in Lopez).
133. See Johnson, supra note 129 (suggesting how such congressional actions might violate
the Effects Clause’s “general Laws” proviso); Koppelman, supra note 105 (noting how the
traditional view of the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposed a stricter sister-state obligation with
regard to judicial judgments and a less stringent obligation with regard to “public Acts”); see also
supra note 102 (quoting a leading full faith and credit scholar’s conclusion that state-granted
licenses should be understood as “public Acts” for full faith and credit purposes).
134. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (“Congress exercises its
conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution. Thus, for example, under
the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate commerce, but
Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the First Amendment. The Tenth
Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress . . . .”). Whether this same limitation applies
to the other possible sources of authority for a CCR statute presents an interesting question. See
text accompanying infra note 175 (discussing this question in the context of the Enforcement
Clause); infra note 152 (discussing this question in the context of the Effects Clause).
135. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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will likely know, the Court has held that even laws otherwise within
Congress’s Commerce Clause power to enact are unconstitutional if they
direct, or “commandeer,” the actions of states in their capacities as sovereign
legislators or law enforcers.
Thus, in New York, the Court struck down a provision of a federal law
regulating the disposal of low-level radioactive waste that offered the states
a choice of either taking title to any such waste produced within its borders
or legislating a solution to the disposal problem pursuant to federallymandated standards. The Court described the first of these options as “no
different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments
to radioactive waste producers.”136 More relevantly, the Court described the
second option—that states craft a legislative solution based on federal
standards—as “commandeering” state governments by forcing their
legislatures to prioritize one policy issue for resolution over others.137
Five years after New York, in Printz v. United States,138 the Court
extended the anti-commandeering principle to apply to state law
enforcement.139 In Printz, the Court struck down a provision of a federal gun
control law that required local law enforcement officials to conduct
background checks of prospective firearms purchasers in certain instances.
Applying similar reasoning as in New York, the Court extended the anticommandeering concept to state law enforcement. At the same time, the
Court, presumably anticipating the logical next question after its ruling,
explicitly endorsed federal “commandeering” of state judiciaries as
constitutionally unobjectionable.140
1. The Basic Argument

02/26/2019 14:13:21

136. N.Y., 505 U.S. at 175.
137. See id. at 175–76.
138. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 928–29 (1997) (distinguishing federal commandeering of state judiciaries on
the authority of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)).
141. Other commenters have identified different anti-commandeering problems with CCR
legislation. See Shearer, supra note 5.
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The anti-commandeering argument against CCR legislation is
seemingly straightforward.141 The argument is that a local police officer
finding a concealed weapon on an individual would be required to enforce
the federal reciprocity rule, and thus honor an out-of-state concealed carry
permit, but only if the officer determined that the out-of-state permit was in
fact valid and that the individual possessed the requisite ID specified in the
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statute.142 Indeed, subsection (c) of the bill explicitly limits the ability of
local police to arrest or detain persons for illegal gun possession, even to the
point of prescribing the probative effect of a person’s presentation of the
permit and identification on the question whether that person falls within the
class of persons permitted to possess a concealed weapon.143 Thus, one
might intuitively understand the CCR bill as a federal direction to local law
enforcement about how they should do their jobs, even to the point of
prescribing federal standards governing their decisions whether or not to
arrest or detain someone.
Nevertheless, this initial argument quickly encounters complexities.
2. The Analogy to the Brady Act

02/26/2019 14:13:21

142. See H.R. 38 §101 (a)
143. Curiously, Section 102 of the bill, titled “Rule of Construction,” appears to limit this
restriction on police conduct by allowing short investigatory stops. See H.R. 38 § 102 (“Nothing
in this title prohibits a law enforcement officer with reasonable suspicion of a violation of any law
from conducting a brief investigative stop in accordance with the Constitution of the United
States.”). This provision is clearly designed to allow police officers to make the investigative stops
the Supreme Court upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). Thus, if subsection (c)(1)’s protection against “detention” means anything, it presumably
means a protection against something more substantial than what has become known as a “Terry
stop,” but something less substantial than an arrest, which subsection (c)(1) mentions
independently. See text accompanying infra notes 154-156 (considering this issue further).
144. Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
145. See, e.g., United States v. California, 314 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1089 (E.D. Ca. 2018) (“Even
requiring state officers to perform discrete, ministerial tasks violates the [anticommandeering]
doctrine.”) (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 929–30).
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One entry point into these complexities is the question whether the
burden on state law enforcement CCR legislation imposes can be analogized
to the burden the Brady Act unconstitutionally imposed on local
jurisdictions’ “chief law enforcement officers” (“CLEOs”), who were
required to conduct the background checks the federal law mandated. In
Printz, the Court concluded that that federal mandate issued to CLEOs
compelled them to “administer a federal program,”144 and thus violated the
anti-commandeering principle. Would the CCR bill do the same?
One preliminary defense of the CCR bill can be rejected at the outset:
In Printz, the Court rejected the argument that the onerousness of the federal
obligation was relevant to the commandeering question.145 Thus, an
argument focusing on the relative ease of complying with the federal
mandate would be unavailing against a commandeering challenge. But other
defenses require more thought. One might defend the CCR bill from an anticommandeering challenge on the ground that the bill would impose no
freestanding obligation on the part of local law enforcement to do anything.
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See Printz, 521 U.S. at 903.
Id. at 933.
But see supra text accompanying note 145.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
See H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101 (c)(1) (2017).
See Shearer, supra note 5, at 439 (noting the difficulty of performing this task).

02/26/2019 14:13:21

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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This defense would seek to distinguish the law struck down in Printz, which
required the CLEO to respond to an individual’s attempted purchase of a
weapon by making reasonable efforts to determine whether the purchase was
legal.146 By contrast, one might argue, a local officer’s obligation to comply
with the federal standards in the CCR bill would arise only upon the officer’s
independent decision to investigate a case of possible illegal gun possession.
But this defense of the CCR bill hardly seems adequate. If a local police
officer in a concealed carry state encounters an individual concealing a
weapon, one would expect the officer in many or most cases to investigate
whether that concealed possession was lawful. In turn, upon being presented
with the individual’s out-of-state permit and then applying the standards set
forth in the federal law, the officer would presumably be “administer[ing] a
federal program,”147 one that has its own requirements and standards, which
might be quite different from those of the host state. Indeed, even assuming
that the onerousness of the federal mandate was relevant to the
commandeering question,148 one might easily conclude that “administer[ing]
[that] federal program”149 would be quite complex, given the officer’s need
to determine even the “facial”150 validity of the out-of-state permit.151
Onerousness aside, state law enforcement discretion would be
significantly limited by subsection (c)(1)’s provision that possession of
“facially valid” documents specified in subsection (a) constitutes “prima
facie evidence” that the individual possesses the federally-required stateissued license. Presumably, states retain the authority, subject to
constitutional limits, to determine what constitutes adequate evidence of a
particular asserted fact, such as the possession of a valid state concealedcarry license. Subsection (c)(1)’s determination of the probative value of a
particular piece of paper, and its direction to local police to give that paper a
particular evidentiary weight, imposes a federal rule of conduct the state
officer is required to apply. It is not hard to imagine its effect on local law
enforcement. For example, consider a scenario in which discovery of several
forged concealed carry permits in the area leads local police to be extra
careful about the validity of permits proffered by persons found to be
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carrying a weapon. Subsection (c)(1)’s prima facie provision would directly
impede a police decision to scrutinize such permits with extra care.152
Perhaps even more significantly, subsection (c)(1)’s limitation on state
law enforcement officers’ ability to “arrest[]” or “detain[]”153 an individual
for any firearms possession-related offense without probable cause to believe
that the federal law’s provisions are being violated constitutes a direct federal
command to state law enforcement. One might initially think that this
command precludes the sort of pre-probable cause/pre-arrest questioning
and pat-downs the Constitution allows law enforcement to perform,154 and
that presumably are an accepted practice in many police departments;
however, Section 102 of the bill appears to expressly disclaim any intent to
restrict such investigative stops.155
This raises the question of what precisely this part of subsection (c)(1)
accomplishes, given that, at one extreme, Section 102 allows investigative
“Terry stops”156 and that, at the other, probable cause is required for an arrest.
Assuming that Section 102 accomplishes something, it presumably prevents
“detentions” longer than short Terry stops that are supported by less than
probable cause. Perhaps such detentions would take the form of longer
detentions while the police officer confirmed the validity of the permit.
(Indeed, this explanation would explain why this provision and the prima
facie evidence provision appear in the same subsection.) But regardless,
assuming that the detention protection provision means something, it
necessarily commands law enforcement to follow federal procedures when
investigating crime and making detention decisions. As such, this provision
intrudes, potentially deeply, into local police procedures, commanding local
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 53 Side B
02/26/2019 14:13:21

152. Of course, this provision could be constitutionally grounded in the Effects Clause,
discussed in Part II (C), supra. But see text accompanying supra note 104 (querying whether the
Effects Clause appropriately applies to on-the-ground police practices). A grounding of this
provision in the Effects Clause would in turn raise the question whether the anti-commandeering
limitation would apply to legislation grounded in that Clause. This is an interesting question: since
the anti-commandeering limitation does not apply to state judiciaries. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 298–
29, most such legislation would not implicate this issue, since presumably most such legislation
would be aimed at state courts. But that might make it more likely that the anti-commandeering
limitation could be applied to such legislation, for example, when it impacted on-the-ground police
procedure rather than state judicial procedure, since imposing such a limitation would not constitute
a severe limitation on congressional power under that clause more generally. There is no
conceptual reason that Effects Clause legislation would automatically be immune from federalismbased limits. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen Sachs, et al., supra note 95 (describing as “at best
unclear” whether the Effects Clause, unlike the Commerce Clause, “confers any power to abrogate
[state] sovereign immunity.”).
153. See H.R. 38, 115th Cong. § 101 (c)(1) (2017).
154. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
155. See supra text accompanying note 143.
156. See id.
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law enforcement to police according to federal-mandated standards as part
of their administration of the federal reciprocity program.
3. A Choice of Law Rule?

See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902–03.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

157.
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But these conclusions are not free of ambiguity. As noted by the earlier
sketched-out objection to the commandeering argument, it remains the case
that the officer’s obligation to administer the federal reciprocity program
arises only upon the voluntary decision of the officer to apply the state’s own
concealed carry restrictions and investigate the legality of the concealed
possession. This reality implies an understanding of the federal bill as
simply a choice of law provision, with the officer required to apply the
federal rule (and thus honor the out-of-state permit) only upon his voluntary
decision to investigate the gun possession.
Thus, one could distinguish the officer’s duties under the CCR bill from
a CLEO’s obligations under the Brady Act, on the theory that the latter law
both explicitly imposed an obligation on the CLEO (to conduct the
background check) and further that the burden it imposed might have been
qualitatively different from any burden he otherwise had under state law. In
other words, while a local police officer encountering a concealed weapon
would presumably proceed to apply his own state’s concealed carry law on
his own, non-commandeered, initiative, altering his conduct only if the
individual in question produced not a local permit but an out-of-state one,
under the Brady Act a CLEO might be required to do something (perform a
background check) that he otherwise would not have done under his own
state’s law. Indeed, this distinction finds indirect support in the fact that the
CLEO-conducted background checks the Brady Act mandated applied when
the state did not otherwise have an instant background check and when the
weapons purchaser did not already possess a state-issued permit issued after
a background check.157 In sum, potentially unlike the CCR bill, the Brady
Act did seem to impose a new type of obligation on the CLEO.
But again this analysis is clouded once one considers other examples.
Consider a local jurisdiction’s policy decision that police officers not inquire
into a victim’s or witness’s immigration status when voluntarily initiating a
conversation with that victim or witness. Would a federal mandate
prohibiting such local rules—or, indeed, mandating that local law
enforcement in fact make such inquiries—simply furnish a choice-of-law
rule requiring adherence to the federal standard, once the police officer had
already exercised her discretion to engage with the victim or witness? Or
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would it conscript the local officer as an enforcer of federal law, as prohibited
by Printz?
4. Murphy v. NCAA

02/26/2019 14:13:21

158. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1462 (2018).
159. The law carved out New Jersey, which was given one year from the law’s enactment to
decide whether to allow sports betting in Atlantic City. The state initially declined to do so, but
after the one year period passed it changed its mind and authorized it, prompting the NCAA to sue,
alleging a violation of PASPA.
160. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479–81.
161. Id. at 1480.
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The Court’s most recent commandeering case may provide an answer
to this puzzle. In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”)158 the Court struck down the federal Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) on the theory that it commandeered state
legislative choices. As relevant for our purposes, PASPA prevented any
state beyond those that already allowed professional sports betting from
legalizing it.159
The Supreme Court held that PASPA did indeed commandeer states.
Speaking through Justice Alito, the Court distinguished PASPA from federal
laws that accomplished uncontroversial federal preemption of state law.
Justice Alito explained that such preemptive laws operated on individuals,
giving them a right to engage in particular conduct regardless of any
conflicting state law.160 He stated that this analysis applied even to
preemptive laws that spoke directly to states, for example, by forbidding
them from enforcing any requirements that conflicted with the federal rule.
Such provisions, Justice Alito noted, simply “confer on private entities . . . a
federal right to engage in certain conduct subject only to certain (federal)
constraints.”161 By contrast, he observed that PASPA’s prohibition on state
action legalizing sports betting did not regulate private parties at all. As he
explained, a private party that engaged in sports betting would not be
violating federal law; rather, PASPA advanced the federal policy disfavoring
such betting solely by prohibiting states from allowing it. Such a prohibition,
he concluded, amounted to unconstitutional commandeering.
At one level, Murphy’s distinction between commandeering and
preemption suggests that the federal reciprocal concealed carry bill does not
run afoul of the commandeering prohibition. After all, subsection (a) is
phrased explicitly as a grant to private persons of a federal right to concealed
carry, if a person satisfies that subsection’s criteria. Nevertheless, this
answer still fails to address questions about subsection (c)’s direction to local
law enforcement, both to refrain from arresting or detaining persons unless
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162. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
163. In particular, it makes no sense to think of an evidentiary rule in this context as regulating
private parties, since the only function of such a rule would be to direct a police decision about the
existence of evidence rendering the gun possession legal.
164. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (offering as an example of a preemptive federal law rather
than an illegitimately-commandeering one a federal statute that “confers on private entities . . . a
federal right to engage in certain conduct subject only to certain (federal) constraints.”).
165. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 55 Side A

probable cause exists to believe that the person is violating the federal rule
of conduct and also to give certain documentation particular evidentiary
effect.
Unlike PASPA, which was clearly a regulation of the state, the CCR
bill is ambiguous on that crucial point. Subsection (a) might be understood
as a grant of a federal license (via the other state’s concealed carry license),
while subsection (c) might be understood as a mandate requiring state law
enforcement to conduct its business in a particular way. Indeed, the best
reading of subsection (c) is that its direction to state police to refrain both
from arresting or even detaining individuals with facially valid out-of-state
carry licenses regulates how local law enforcement use their law
enforcement discretion, by restricting them from taking law enforcement
steps the Constitution permits them to take.162 Similarly, subsection (c)’s
provision of a federal rule of evidence for local law enforcement to apply
appears to regulate how a state determines the probative weight of particular
pieces of evidence.
Taken together, it is hard to see subsection (c) as anything other than an
instruction to local police to follow the federal law enforcement rule, rather
than a regulation of a private party that merely preempts inconsistent state
regulation.163 If one takes seriously Murphy’s distinction between laws that
regulate governments and laws that regulate individuals, this provision of
subsection (c) should be understood as a federal directive to state law
enforcement, and thus invalid under the anti-commandeering principle.
Consider perhaps the strongest contrary argument. This argument
would describe the CCR bill as granting a nationwide federal concealed carry
license to persons who have a valid state license. This description would
bring it within Murphy’s description of a purely preemptive federal
regulation of individual parties.164 Indeed, one could analogize the holder of
the federally-endorsed state-issued concealed carry permit with Thomas
Gibbons from Gibbons v. Ogden,165 who held a federal coasting license that
the Supremacy Clause required New York authorities to recognize as
superseding Aaron Ogden’s conflicting state-granted monopoly. On this
argument, subsection (c)’s provisions might be justified as providing merely
the procedural details governing how that individual right is to be vindicated.
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In particular, one could argue that the detention provision ensures that the
holder of the out-of-state permit enjoys a degree of substantive liberty when
exercising his federally-granted right, subject only to subsection (c)’s
evidentiary rule.
But this final step seems one too far. The best way to read subsection
(c) is as a regulation of how state officials should go about using their law
enforcement discretion. First, subsection (c) is—indeed, can only be read
as—a direct regulation of states. It is not phrased as a grant of a license to
private parties,166 and, as a prescription of particular police procedures, it
cannot be so read if Murphy’s distinction between regulation of states and
regulation of individuals is to be accorded any force.167
Second, subsection (c) clearly directs how state officials—here, state
law enforcement—perform their duties, and vetoes certain decisions, such as
to detain a person while investigating his concealed carry permit. To quote
Murphy, under PASPA “[i]t is as if federal officers were installed in state
legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators
from voting on any offending proposals.”168 Substitute “at the scene of a
local police investigation” for “in state legislative chambers,” “police” for
“legislators,” and “using their state-authorized law enforcement discretion”
for “voting on any offending proposals,” and we have described the situation
required by CCR. None of these substitutions is constitutionally relevant:
Printz extends the anti-commandeering doctrine to law enforcement, and it
does not matter that CCR prohibits certain police activity (namely, detaining
a person asserting a concealed carry right based on an out-of-state permit)
rather than compelling it. Rejecting a similar argument, the Murphy Court
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 55 Side B
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166. Cf. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (“since the Constitution confers upon Congress the power
to regulate individuals, not States, [a federal law alleged to be merely preemptive rather than
commandeering] must be best read as one that regulates private actors” in order to be constitutional)
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
167. To be sure, this distinction does not turn on the wording of a given provision. As the
Court explained in Murphy, a law could be worded as a prohibition on a state regulating a private
party but still be best understood as a grant of a federal license to engage in particular action. See
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (using as an example of this phenomenon a federal law deregulating
airlines and prohibiting any state from imposing its own regulations on the federally-deregulated
conduct). But subsection (c) differs from this template: unlike the airline example Murphy
provided, it does not regulate states in the service of vindicating federal regulation (or deregulation) of private persons’ primary conduct. Instead, it regulates the means by which state law
enforcement investigate whether in fact the individual in question is exercising the federallygranted right. Indeed, that regulation extends far beyond federal insistence that that right exist, to
intrude into the realm of police investigative procedures—most notably, police decisions whether
or not to detain a person while determining whether that person is indeed validly exercising that
federal right.
168. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
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169. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
170. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that the result of the Court’s holding was that the federal government would be
incentivized to send federal law enforcement officials into the states to perform the required
background checks).
171. Indeed, such a dynamic would presumably entail the detention of the individual until the
federal officer arrived, contradicting subsection (c).
172. But see supra Part II (raising questions about that authority).
173. See supra text accompanying note 134.
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observed that the distinction between prohibiting and compelling state action
“is empty.”169
Thus, whatever one might say about subsection (a)’s grant of a federal
right to carry a concealed weapon in any concealed-carry state by producing
any state’s concealed carry permit, subsection (c)’s directions to local police
as to how to investigate and enforce this provision violates the anticommandeering doctrine. To be sure, the CCR situation is not on all fours
with the situation in Printz. In Printz it was both theoretically possible and
practically workable for federal officials to be tasked with performing the
background checks the Brady Act required.170 By contrast, the typical law
enforcement situation CCR presents involves a local police officer
encountering a person concealing a weapon. Given that situation, it is
implausible that the local officer could immediately summon a federal
official who would then take charge of the concealed carry investigation.171
One might think that this reality requires the conclusion that subsection
(c) does not commandeer state law enforcement. This argument insists that
it would be constitutionally unacceptable for the federal government to find
itself unable fully to vindicate the concealed carry right that we are
presuming it has the constitutional authority to confer.172 Thus, one might
conclude, the federal government’s presumed power to confer that right must
mean that subsection (c)’s measures for vindicating it simply cannot violate
the anti-commandeering principle.
But that conclusion would be incorrect. First, as noted earlier,173 even
laws that unquestionably constitute federal regulation of interstate commerce
are subject to the anti-commandeering limitation. None of the anticommandeering cases suggests that the prohibition on commandeering must
give way when that prohibition prevents a federal right from being fully
vindicated. Second, and more generally, it is simply wrong to say that
Congress must have the power to fully vindicate any right that it has the
power to confer. Indeed, the very federalism concerns that animate the
commandeering prohibition create exactly such results in other doctrinal
areas. For example, Eleventh Amendment immunity often prevents a federal
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174. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (concluding that the
Interstate Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity to
claims seeking retrospective relief such as damages for violations of a congressionally-granted right
enacted on the authority of that clause). Of course, such a plaintiff could attempt to get around the
Eleventh Amendment’s immunity grant, but such attempts are by no means automatically or nearlyautomatically successful—and, importantly, such attempts do not gain force merely because they
reflect fallback attempts to vindicate a federal right once a first remedy is deemed unavailable. See
id. (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that its lawsuit against the state was allowable under Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), after holding that its statutory claim was unavailable).
175. See Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 65–66 (1996).
176. The evidentiary provision could also be supportable under the power Article IV’s full
faith and credit guarantee gives to Congress. But see supra Part II (C) (analyzing that power
generally and in particular as applied to the evidentiary provision); see also supra note 152
(considering whether an Effects Clause grounded statute might also be subject to the anticommandeering limitation).
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right-holder from suing a state that is violating that right, and thus prevents
her from vindicating it.174
This argument also ignores the crucial question of the constitutional
power Congress would be relying on when enacting CCR legislation. As
explained immediately above, relying on the commerce power to create the
reciprocal concealed carry right carries with it the anti-commandeering
limitation on that power, even if that limitation means that the right cannot
be fully vindicated. But other congressional powers may not be subject to
the anti-commandeering limitation. Most notably, there is a real question
whether laws based on Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power are subject to the anti-commandeering restriction. After all, as the
Court has noted in a different context,175 the Fourteenth Amendment is a
direct restriction on state power, and differs from the Commerce Clause on
that basis. The distinctive character of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a set of explicit “thou shalt nots” directed to states makes it
at least plausible, if not outright logical, that the anti-commandeering
prohibition does not apply to congressional attempts to enforce those
restrictions on state conduct.
Thus, there might be a way for Congress to accomplish the apparent
commandeering that subsection (c) seeks to accomplish. But that would
require Congress to ground a CCR statute in its power to enforce either the
Second Amendment, the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the bill’s limits
on police’s power to detain persons suspected of a concealed weapons
violation), or perhaps the Due Process Clause more generally (as applied to
the bill’s insistence that a particular quantum of evidence is sufficient to
make out a prima facie showing of lawful concealed carry).176 While this
Article has bracketed a full discussion of congressional power to enact CCR
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legislation under its enforcement power,177 very serious questions cloud any
such claim, either with regard to the CCR right generally or subsection (c)
of the bill in particular.178 While that question requires fuller study and
analysis, it should be understood that, with one possible exception,179 only
the enforcement power could even potentially justify subsection (c).
5. Policy Arguments

02/26/2019 14:13:21

177. But see supra Part II (B).
178. See supra note 73 (citing scholars remarking on the strictness of the Court’s scrutiny of
federal legislation grounded on the Enforcement Clause).
179. Article IV authorizes congressional action to “prescribe the Manner” by which the actions
subject to the Full Faith and Credit Clause “shall be proved,” “and the Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST.
art. IV § 1. At most, this power might allow Congress to prescribe a rule regarding how the
existence of an out-of-state concealed carry license may be proven. This power might thus allow
Congress to prescribe subsection (c)’s prima facie evidence provision. However, such an argument
assumes what is by no means proven—that a concealed carry permit is in fact subject to the full
faith and credit guarantee, and that Congress’s Article IV power extends into the context of on-theground state law enforcement conduct. See supra Part II (C) (discussing this question briefly).
This power would presumably not authorize subsection (c)’s rule governing police officers’
discretion to detain persons who produce an out-of-state permit supporting their concealed carry.
And again, any such Effects Clause argument would encounter the possibility that laws enacted
pursuant to that authority are subject to the anti-commandeering limitation. See supra note 152.
180. E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997) (explaining the anticommandeering idea in these terms).
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Beyond doctrinal details, the broader policies underlying the anticommandeering rule also suggest the problematic nature of the CCR bill.
Most notably, the anti-commandeering doctrine serves, among other
purposes, to ensure that the public remains able to assign blame (or praise)
for particular regulatory initiatives to the proper level of government.180
Thus, for example, by mandating that states develop a policy addressing the
safe disposal of low-level radioactive waste, the federal statute struck down
in New York blurred the lines of governmental accountability by imposing
on state governments a federal mandate to prioritize that policy issue over
others. Similarly, the Brady Act’s background check provision required
local law enforcement officers to spend time satisfying that federal mandate,
thus blurring accountability when the CLEO necessarily deprioritized other
law enforcement needs.
One can easily envision a scenario in which a local police officer’s
decision not to arrest or even detain someone found to be concealing a
weapon would raise the public’s concern about how that officer was using
her discretion. That type of situation seems exactly the one the Court worried
about in New York and Printz, with the public objecting to how local officers
were using their discretion and the officers in turn pointing to the federal
mandate and attempting to explain that they had no choice. For example,
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B. The Non-Delegation Defense
A final argument for questioning the constitutionality of the federal
reciprocal concealed carry bill is both the least plausible-sounding but
potentially the most meritorious. It may be that such a law would (or should)
be struck down as violating the non-delegation doctrine.
The most obvious objection to this suggestion is the well-known
characterization of the non-delegation doctrine as a moribund relic of the
pre-1937 Court. But that characterization oversimplifies a more nuanced

See supra Part II (considering Congress’s authority to enact CCR legislation).
See text accompanying supra notes 164-171.

02/26/2019 14:13:21

181.
182.
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imagine a federal mandate that, upon discovery of an immigrant’s unlawful
residency status, local officers had to detain the immigrant. One can easily
imagine local citizens objecting to that use of the officer’s discretion, and
finding themselves frustrated when the officer explained that she was simply
complying with a federal mandate.
The hard question here is whether the CCR bill’s provision of rules
governing arrest and detention of individuals possessing concealed weapons,
and its provision of a rule of evidence for determining the legality of any
instance of concealed possession, are best understood as elements of the
concealed possession right the federal government presumably181 has the
authority to confer, or a regulation of how state law enforcement exercises
its discretion. This Article has already discussed this issue in the context of
discussing the details of anti-commandeering doctrine.182 But, appropriately
enough, the same issue arises when one considers that doctrine’s underlying
justification. In considering this final question, it may simply be that both
legislation that unconstitutionally commandeers and legislation that simply
preempts state law to grant a federal right implicate accountability concerns.
For example, one can envision angry New Yorkers asking their port
commissioner why Aaron Ogden’s monopoly is not being enforced, or angry
New Yorkers asking an NYPD officer why their concealed carry law is not
being enforced, and feeling unsatisfied when the commissioner or the officer
points to Thomas Gibbons’ or the out-of-state gun carrier’s federal (or
federally-endorsed) license and explaining that he had no choice but to honor
it.
This uncomfortable reality—that accountability is blurred regardless of
how we conceptualize the federal law in question—perhaps means,
ironically, that a more formalist conception of the commandeering concept
is the best approach. If so, then at least subsection (c)’s provisions appear
vulnerable to the anti-commandeering claim.
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reality.183 Beyond the equally well-known fact that the Court has never
formally repudiated the doctrine, in recent decades the Court has employed
the threat of a non-delegation strike-down as justification for giving
narrowing interpretations to otherwise broad-sounding statutes.184 More
recently, the Court’s cert. grant on the non-delegation issue in United States
v. Gundy185 makes it clear that interest exists at the Court in examining at
least the potential for a renewed focus on the non-delegation principle.
Unless the Court completely dismisses the non-delegation argument in
Gundy as frivolous, any decision it renders—even one upholding the
statute—will presumably warrant lower courts giving this argument more
than cursory attention when litigants raise it.
The CCR bill, if it ever became law, would likely be a good candidate
for any such revitalized non-delegation scrutiny. Two features of such a law
work together to make this the case. First, such a law would delegate power
to states, rather than to an instrumentality of the federal government (such as
an executive branch or independent administrative agency). Second, that
delegation would lack even the hint of a standard. This sub-Part considers
these issues in that order.
1. Delegation to a State

The first unusual feature of the CCR bill is that it would delegate power
to a state, by prescribing that state-determined standards all-but fully
govern186 when a person could obtain a concealed carry permit that then, by
operation of that statute, would be valid in any state that allows any form of
concealed carry.
a. Federal Incorporation of State Law

02/26/2019 14:13:21

183. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (“Reports
of the death of the nondelegation doctrine have been greatly exaggerated.”).
184. See, e.g., Indust. Union Dep’t AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980) (plurality opinion) (adopting limited interpretation of a federal workplace safety law in order
to avoid serious non-delegation problem); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457
(2001) (doing the same to a federal environmental law); cf. National Cable TV Ass’n v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (construing a congressional authorization to an agency to collect a fee
as not authorizing it to levy a tax, given the non-delegation problems that would arise in that latter
case). See also Sunstein, supra note 183.
185. United States v. Gundy, 695 Fed. Appx. 639 (2017).
186. To be sure, the bill limits the reciprocal effect of state-issued concealed carry permits to
persons “not prohibited by federal law from . . . possessing a firearm.” H.R. 38, 115th Cong. §
101(a) (2017).
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To be sure, the mere incorporation of state law into federal law—and
thus, the implied delegation to state lawmakers—has long been held to not
raise a serious non-delegation problem. A well-known example of such

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 58 Side B

02/26/2019 14:13:21

ARAIZA_MACRO_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE)

610

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

2/15/2019 5:19 PM

[Vol. 46:3

Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559, 569 (1910).
355 U.S. 286 (1958).
See id. at 297 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J.).
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187.
188.
189.
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incorporation is the series of assimilative crimes laws Congress has enacted
since the early 19th century. These federal laws make applicable in federal
enclaves such as military bases and national parks the criminal laws of the
state in which the given enclave is located. In 1910, the Court in easily and
quickly rejected a non-delegation attack on such laws.187 However, until the
mid-20th century such laws were static, in the sense that they adopted as
federal law whatever state law was at that point extant. Thus, these versions
of the assimilative crimes laws simply accomplished incorporation by
reference, as if Congress had merely copied verbatim the criminal codes of
the states as they existed at that moment and made them federal law in the
relevant enclaves.
As one can imagine, crafting these assimilative crimes laws in this static
way was not ideal, as the federal law of an enclave would slowly become
inconsistent with that of the surrounding state as that state gradually altered
its laws. Thus, in 1948, Congress enacted a dynamic assimilative crimes
law, one that made the law of the surrounding state applicable in the relevant
enclave, but also continued to update that federal law as the law of the
surrounding state changed. A concealed carry reciprocity law would be more
analogous to this latter version of the assimilative crime statute, since it
would adopt as federal law a rule based on state concealed carry laws as
those state laws evolved. One can understand why such a law would pose a
more serious non-delegation challenge than its static incorporation
predecessors, since it would be impossible for a court to uphold it on the
theory that Congress had essentially simply copied into the U.S. Code the
actual state laws that it wished to incorporate.
Despite this more troubling feature, in United States v. Sharpnack188 the
Court rejected a non-delegation challenge to the dynamic assimilative crimes
law. Interestingly—especially for the standard story about the nondelegation doctrine becoming moribund after 1935—two justices would
have held the federal law invalid on non-delegation grounds.189 The
majority, speaking through Justice Burton, explained that, despite its
dynamic incorporation of state law, the federal statute nevertheless reflected
a congressional policy—namely, that federal enclaves be governed by the
same criminal law as the surrounding states, except as that state law might
be superseded by particular federal criminal prohibitions. In his opinion,
Justice Burton relied heavily on the history of such assimilative crimes laws,
which he said reflected a consistent congressional policy to that effect, and

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 59 Side A

02/26/2019 14:13:21

ARAIZA_MACRO_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE)

2/15/2019 5:19 PM

Spring 2019] RECIPROCAL CONCEALED CARRY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

611

concluded that the dynamic statute challenged in Sharpnack merely carried
forth that policy more efficiently.
A moment’s reflection makes clear that many federal laws incorporate
state law, and, indeed, do so dynamically. As examples, Social Security law
uses state law definitions of marriage and the Federal Tort Claims Act
subjects the United States to legal liability based on the tort law of the state
in which the tort occurred.190 Such laws have not triggered serious nondelegation challenges. Perhaps most ironically, one of the 1935 nondelegation cases, Panama Refining v. Ryan,191 authorized the President to
prohibit the interstate shipment of oil that was extracted or removed from
storage in excess of state law quotas. While Panama Refining struck down
that authority as a violation of the non-delegation doctrine, the reason was
not the state law-foundation for the conduct Congress authorized the
President to take.192
Nevertheless, important differences would distinguish a CCR law from
these latter examples, and even from the dynamic assimilative crimes statute.
Most significantly, these other laws’ incorporation of state law all relate in
some way to the state whose law is being incorporated. Crimes on a federal
enclave in South Dakota are governed by South Dakota law, a tort committed
by a federal entity in Texas is governed by Texas law, and a retired couple
in Connecticut are married for Social Security purposes if Connecticut
recognizes their marriage. By contrast, the federal reciprocal concealed
carry law adopts state laws for the purpose of making those laws applicable
nationwide.
b. Incorporation or Delegation?

Sharpnack, 355 U.S. at 295; see also id. at 297 (more examples extant as of 1958).
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
See id. at 414–30.
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This nationwide effect might be an odd feature of a CCR law, but why
should it matter for non-delegation purposes? It matters because Congress
is the national law-maker. These other instances of federal incorporation of
state law do not authorize any state to make law with nationwide effect.
Under the assimilative crimes act, a crime on a federal enclave in South
Dakota may be governed by South Dakota, but a crime on a federal enclave
in North Dakota is not. Similarly, if Connecticut recognizes marriages
between first cousins, then such a pairing living in Hartford would be eligible
for Social Security survivor benefits, but if Massachusetts does not recognize
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such marriages, then an analogous pairing in Boston would not.193 By
contrast, under a CCR law, a holder of a concealed carry permit issued by
Vermont may take that permit into New York and insist that New York
recognize it. National law is thus made by one state.
In turn, this feature of a CCR law matters for a reason that goes to both
the theoretical foundation of the non-delegation principle, and the
relationship between federal and state power. Federalizing any rule that a
state may wish to make, with no federally-imposed substantive standards
guiding that rule, allows one state to make rules applicable beyond its
borders. This violates the constitutional principle implicit in the nondelegation doctrine—and, indeed, more generally in the republican character
of the federal government—that federal law must be made through a process
that features representation of all of the people.
Delegations to states to make policy binding on other states violate that
principle. This is not an indictment of the motives of state lawmakers. Both
in the gun context and beyond, local or regional needs may vary greatly,194
and lawmakers crafting legislation, such as a concealed carry regime, are
presumably responding to the unique needs of their own constituents.
Almost by definition, authorizing the most permissive state to foist its rules
onto every other state thus constitutes national-level lawmaking that does not
take the full national polity’s interests into account, either as a matter of
process or likely ultimate result.195
c. The Private Delegation Analogy
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193. See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852) (upholding a federal law that
incorporated dynamic state-law standards regarding navigation pilotage, but only as those standards
applied to the ports of the particular state imposing those standards).
194. See generally Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013).
195. See Norman Williams, Why Congress May Not ‘Overrule’ the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153 (2005) (concluding that delegations of interstate commerce
regulatory power to states is closer to historically disfavored attempts to delegate such power to
private parties than it is to the assertion of such power by Congress itself).
196. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
197. The Court also held that the law exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
See id. at 297–310.
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Supreme Court delegation doctrine acknowledges this concern. In
Carter v. Carter Coal,196 the Court struck down, partly197 on non-delegation
grounds, the part of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 that
authorized producers of two-thirds of the coal in a given district to set the
minimum wage for coal miners for all mines in that district. Writing for five
justices, Justice Sutherland condemned this provision as “delegation in its
most obnoxious form,” because “it [was] not even delegation to an official
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or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose
interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same
business.”198
To be sure, it is easy to dismiss the modern relevance of Carter Coal,
given its status as a final expression of the pre-1937 Court’s hostility to
federal regulation of the economy.199 Still, Chief Justice Hughes, who wrote
the opinion that signaled the switch to a broader federal commerce power,200
wrote a concurrence in Carter Coal that agreed with the majority’s nondelegation analysis,201 while Justice Cardozo, joined by Justices Brandeis
and Stone, declined to reach the non-delegation question.202 Moreover, when
Congress legislated in analogous areas immediately after Carter Coal,
including a second attempt at regulating coal mining itself, it crafted
regulatory regimes that were careful to place ultimate regulatory power with
the relevant federal agency, even if producers and other market participants
retained a role in the process.203 When the Court upheld these provisions, it
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198. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311. Chief Justice Hughes concurred with this part of the result,
id. at 317, 318 (separate opinion of Hughes, C.J.). Justice Cardozo, joined by Justices Brandeis
and Stone, did not reach this issue, as he considered the challenge to this provision to be premature.
Id. at 324 (Cardozo, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Justice Sutherland’s criticism of such private delegations reveals what one might understand as the
mirror image of the concern, expressed in the text, see text accompanying supra notes 193-195,
about national law being made by national authorities. Justice Sutherland contrasted the private
lawmaking he condemned in Carter Coal to law made “by an official or an official body,
presumptively disinterested.” Id. In doing so, he condemned that provision in the coal statute as a
violation of due process. See 298 U.S. at 311. His citation of due process is striking, until one
remembers the anti-class legislation tradition that animated much of the pre-1937 Court’s thinking.
See generally Melissa Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96
MICH. L. REV. 245 (1997) (discussing class legislation); WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A BRIEF
INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 11–28 (2017) (same). A classic definition of class legislation
was legislation that aimed not at furthering the public interest, but benefitting one private group.
See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31, 32 (1884) (“Special burdens are often necessary for
general benefits . . . . Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is
prohibited; but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if
within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not [prohibited by
the Fourteenth Amendment].”). One can easily understand how a grant of power to a private
individual, “presumptively []interested,” would run afoul of the class legislation principle and thus
of the Due Process Clause. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311 (noting how some coal producers might
favor the contents of the coal code promulgated by a discrete set of private coal interests, while
others might not).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941) (recognizing that Carter
Coal’s Commerce Clause analysis had been limited by intervening cases).
200. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
201. See supra text accompanying note 198.
202. See id.
203. See United States v. Rock-Royal Cooperative, 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939) (explaining the
analogous provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937); see Sunshine Anthracite Coal
Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 340, 397–99 (1940) (explaining the analogous provisions of the

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 60 Side B

02/26/2019 14:13:21

ARAIZA_MACRO_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE)

614

2/15/2019 5:19 PM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 46:3

was careful to distinguish the delegation to private parties that was struck
down in Carter Coal, rather than simply overruling that earlier case.204
Congress’s reaction to Carter Coal, and the Court’s approving reply, at least
suggests a constitutional settlement disfavoring, if not out-and-out
prohibiting, delegations of federal regulatory power to private persons.205
d. The Analogy Between Private and State Delegations

Of course, Carter Coal and its progeny, whatever we may make of them
today, involved delegations of federal power to private persons. CCR
legislation involves a delegation of federal power to states. Nevertheless,
these judicial condemnations of private delegations reflect the same concerns
that arise with delegations of nationally-scoped federal power to states.206 In
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Congress routinely enlists states, tribes, and even private individuals in
implementing federal regulatory programs, thereby suggesting that the modern
constitutional order permits the sharing of federal legislative authority. One must
be careful, however, before drawing too definitive or categorical a conclusion. The
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Bituminous Coal Act of 1937); id. at 387 (noting that the 1937 law was enacted in response to the
Court’s decision in Carter Coal).
204. See Sunshine Anthracite, 310 U.S. at 399 (rejecting a non-delegation challenge to the
analogous provisions of the 1937 coal statute by citing Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15–6 (1939),
which itself had upheld analogous provisions in a tobacco marketing statute by concluding that
those provisions vested regulatory power with the federal agency even if marketers played a role
in the regulatory approval process, and which also distinguished Carter Coal on this ground); see
Rock-Royal, 307 U.S. at 507–08 (similarly relying on Currin to reject a non-delegation challenge
to an analogous provision in an agricultural marketing statute).
205. See, e.g., Sunstein, “Nondelegation Canons,” supra note 183. It must be conceded that
the Court took that same tack with regard to Carter Coal’s Commerce Clause analysis (that is,
distinguishing it rather than overruling it), even if by then the Court had clearly moved on to a
different conception of the commerce power. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 123 (“So far as Carter v.
Carter Coal Co. is inconsistent with this conclusion, its doctrine is limited in principle by the
decisions under the Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act, which we have cited and
which we follow.”) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, Carter Coal’s non-delegation principle has
survived in a way that its commerce power analysis has not. See, e.g., Boerschig v. Trans-Pecos
Pipeline L.L.C., 872 F.3d 701, 707 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Although th[e] so-called ‘private
nondelegation’ doctrine has been largely dormant in the years since [the early decades of the
Twentieth century], its continuing force is generally accepted.”); see also Department of Transp. v.
Association of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234, 1238 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (“By
any measure, handing off regulatory power to a private entity is ‘legislative delegation in its most
obnoxious form.’”) (quoting Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311).
206. Certainly, it is true that many cooperative federalism programs, for example, involving
environmental law, authorize a state role in the federal regulatory process. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (explaining the concept of cooperative federalism). These
authorizations may not constitute “delegations” in the strict sense. See, e.g., Williams, supra note
195, at 221 (“Congress’s pursuit of a cooperative, regulatory federalism may not involve the
delegation of federal authority at all but simply the enlistment of the states’ voluntary use of their
own residual state authority in aid of federal regulatory goals.”)

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 61 Side A

02/26/2019 14:13:21

ARAIZA_MACRO_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE)

2/15/2019 5:19 PM

Spring 2019] RECIPROCAL CONCEALED CARRY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

615

both cases, power and control are divorced—power is granted to regulate
persons who in turn exercise no control over their regulators.207 In such
cases, the regulators are unaccountable to the persons they regulate.208
This principle of accountability underlies the non-delegation
But it applies more generally throughout American
doctrine.209
constitutional law. It underlies a variety of canonical federalism concepts,
indeed, including the anti-commandeering doctrine.210 Even more relevantly
for our current purposes, it underlies foundational doctrine in areas as
disparate as inter-governmental tax immunity211 and the dormant Commerce
Clause,212 both of which deal with the problem posed by CCR legislation—
that is, the problem of one state attempting to foist its regulatory choices onto
the rest of the nation. However one views the problem—as one of
congressional evasion of accountability when it enacts overly-broad
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Court’s use of delegation-sounding terminology may be thoughtless and therefore
misleading.
Id. at 220–21.
But even if one considers such cooperative federalism programs a species of federal delegation to
states, the delegation remains geographically limited, given that under these programs the state
gains authority to regulate its own citizens within its own territory.
207. Cf. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.C.D.C. 1971)
(“Concepts of control and accountability define the constitutional [non-delegation] requirement.”).
208. Whether this analogy carries so far as to condemn delegation of nationally-scoped federal
regulatory power to states as a violation of due process, see Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311, or whether
the violation remains “simply” one of the non-delegation principle itself, is an interesting question
that this Article brackets.
209. See supra text accompanying note 207.
210. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (“Accountability is . . .
diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with
the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”).
211. See McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (expressing concern about recognizing
a state’s power to tax, and thus at least theoretically to destroy, a federal instrumentality which is
the product of the entire nation’s regulatory choice); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-30 at 512 (2d ed. 1988) (“Operation of a federal instrumentality
necessarily affects the interests of all since it is for the benefit of all; the national power must
therefore remain unfettered if control and representation are to be coincident.”) (citing, inter alia,
McColloch, 17 U.S. at 435–36).
212. See South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2
(1938) (singling out for special concern state regulations affecting interstate commerce “whose
purpose or effect is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without,
or to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within” on the
theory that “that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon
those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the
state”). Indeed, after this quote, the Court cited the page from Cooley in which the Court expressed
confidence that local pilotage requirements, since they impose burdens on merchants using that
port, can be expected to be kept to the minimum necessary to satisfy the legitimate needs underlying
such requirements. See id. (citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 315 (1851)).
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213. See infra text accompanying notes 220-221.
214. See supra text accompanying note 210.
215. See supra text accompanying note 211.
216. See supra text accompanying note 212.
217. See supra text accompanying note 198.
218. This problem is not cured by making the standards of each and every individual state
applicable nationwide, because each state’s standards, as implemented through each state’s
concealed carry permitting decisions, are created by that state’s polity and only that state’s polity.
See text accompanying supra notes 206-208.
219. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971).
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statutes,213 federal evasion of accountability when it imposes regulatory
burdens on state governments,214 state evasion of accountability when it
burdens federal instrumentalities215 or interstate commerce,216 or arbitrary
(that is, non-public regarding) action more generally217—there emerges the
unifying theme of the problem caused by an asymmetrical relationship
between power over persons and those persons’ control over those who wield
that power.
None of this analysis casts doubt on a truly national decision-making
process yielding a decision to adopt and thus effectively nationalize one
state’s rule. Thus, for example, Congress could adopt, copy or even
incorporate by reference the standards under Vermont law for a concealed
carry permit, and make those standards federal law, applicable nationwide.
But CCR legislation does not do this. Instead, it adopts the standards of an
individual state and makes them applicable nationwide. When it does that it
turns over the power to bind all of the American people to the people of one
given state.218
As noted earlier, some federal laws, such as the modern Assimilative
Crimes Act, do bind federal law to the ongoing policy and legal decisions
made by the people of one state. But such laws do so in a much more
geographically limited way, in a context in which Congress may well have a
legitimate interest in incorporating that state’s law—for example, by
applying that state’s law to apply on federal enclaves within that state or
applying that state’s law to tort claims against the federal government arising
out of alleged torts occurring in that state. By contrast, abdicating the power
to make nationwide law—law for all of the American people—to any one
state violates the very idea of a national legislature that draws its authority
from all the American people and that alone has the authority to legislate in
the name of the American people.
If “concepts of control and
accountability” underlie the non-delegation doctrine,219 then such control,
and surely such accountability, is just as decisively lost when Congress
delegates power to a state to legislate for the nation as it is when Congress
delegates lawmaking authority to a private party.
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2. Reciprocity as the Lack of a Standard

02/26/2019 14:13:21

220. Cf. Department of Transp. v. Ass’n. of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1234, 1238 (2015)
(Alito, J., concurring) (distinguishing congressional delegation of power to a federal
instrumentality, for which some justification might be sufficient, with delegation of that power to
a private party, for which “there is not even a fig leaf of constitutional justification”).
221. Id. at 1234, 1238 (Alito, J., concurring) (drawing a similar distinction). The requirements
in the CCR bill—that the person hold a valid ID and a valid concealed carry permit (or be eligible
to do so in the person’s home state), and be qualified under federal law to possess, transport, or
receive a firearm under federal law, do not change this conclusion, as they still leave to each state
the discretion to decide who is eligible to possess a permit, with no standards governing those
choices. In particular, the requirement that the individual be eligible to possess a firearm under
federal law is presumably intended simply to protect the integrity of existing federal law—that is,
to prevent the holder of a concealed permit to use the federal concealed carry right to defeat any
other federally-imposed restriction on that person’s possession of a firearm.
222. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that
the federal law delegating power to the U.S. Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing
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This conclusion leads to the second, closely-related, reason a CCR law
should be understood as raising serious non-delegation concerns: the lack of
standards. As noted at the end of the previous section, Congress could easily
and legitimately decide that one particular state’s standard or rule governing
certain conduct should be nationalized. Since it could enact that state rule
by copying the relevant language from the state code, there’s no reason it
could not incorporate that language by reference. But in doing so, the federal
law would be enacting a discernable legal standard. Even if that standard
was vague (for example, because the state law being copied was vague), the
resulting federal law would still be subject only to the deferential scrutiny
modern non-delegation jurisprudence demands.220
But Congress’s wholesale incorporation of any and all standards
adopted by states, and its elevation of those state standards to rules of
nationwide applicability (rather than rules governing the relationship of the
federal government and federal programs to a given state) is different. Such
a congressional decision reflects no choice at all about what substantive
standards should govern concealed firearms carry nationwide. Thus, this is
not a situation where Congress enacts standards, which are then challenged
as too vague. That latter situation triggers the well-known critique that
courts lack the capacity to distinguish between legislative standards that may
be vague but are sufficiently determinate to state an “intelligible principle”
and those that are simply too vague to tolerate. By contrast, CCR legislation
simply abdicates the task of enacting any standards at all.221 Indeed, one way
of describing it is as a literal delegation of the lawmaking task, rather than
the specification of an admittedly-vague standard whose application by an
entity other than Congress might be considered either (illegitimate)
lawmaking or (legitimate) administration.222
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Does this analysis mean that Congress is powerless to legislate
nationwide reciprocity on any topic? Not necessarily. As long as a federal
law provided minimal substantive standards for such reciprocity, then it’s
possible that such a law would survive non-delegation scrutiny. In that case,
those minimal standards would reveal the substantive choices Congress
made about the relevant regulatory issue. But “pure” reciprocity does not
itself reflect a substantive policy. Such a policy “choice” would be better
understood as a complete abdication of the obligation to make a choice.
To illustrate this final point, consider that a federal “policy” of pure
reciprocity can be analogized to a federal policy that whatever Arizona
chooses with regard to concealed carry will be national policy. The only
difference between this “policy” and the CCR bill is that the latter enshrines
a policy in which the choices of the 49 other states, rather than just Arizona’s,
becomes binding on every state. Just as a federal “policy” to make Arizona’s
choices national law is no federal policy at all, but an abdication of policymaking power to the Arizona legislature, so too making the choices of each
state national policy, each binding on all the others, reflects no meaningful
federal policy choice. If abdication to Arizona violates the non-delegation
principle, then abdication to each of the 50 states does as well—50 times
over.

Conclusion

02/26/2019 14:13:21

guidelines was “a pure delegation of legislative power” because that delegated power did not come
with any authority either to administer the statute or adjudicate claims under it). To be sure, Justice
Scalia’s argument in Mistretta is slightly different from the one made here. Justice Scalia’s
concern, at least in part, was that the delegation of power to the Commission did not come with any
accompanying mandate to administer the statute or adjudicate claims under it. Thus, that delegation
could not be described as a delegation of quasi-executive or quasi-judicial power—hence, his
description of the law as a delegation of “pure” legislative power. Whether the CCR bill’s
delegation could be similarly described is a complex question, in light of the fact that, on the one
hand, states would remain responsible for administering their concealed carry regimes but, on the
other, that administration would remain administration of a state rather than a federal program.
223. But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“if . . . earlier Congresses
avoided use of this highly attractive power [to conscript state officials to enforce federal law], we
would have reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist”).
224. National Fed. of Indep. Businesses v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012).

41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 62 Side B

Concealed carry reciprocity is a novel concept. Of course, that novelty
does not necessarily count against its constitutionality;223 as Chief Justice
Roberts observed when evaluating the constitutionality of what he viewed as
the novel regulatory expedient of compelling Americans to participate in
interstate commerce, “there is a first time for everything.”224 On the other
hand, in the very next sentence in his opinion he stated, “[b]ut sometimes the
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most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of
historical precedent for Congress’s action.”225
In the case of concealed carry reciprocity, the most that can be said at
this point is that the constitutional authority for such novel legislation is far
from settled, despite the obvious candidates this Article has preliminarily
canvassed.226 Moreover, such legislation raises serious questions about
whether it transgresses important constitutional limitations.227 This Article’s
analysis suggests that the ultimate fate of this regulatory experiment is
already seriously clouded, even before it has been enacted.
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Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 549 (internal quotation omitted; brackets in original).
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
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